




Industrial[★] Security

JULY, 1961

Vol. 5, No. 3

DONALD W. SMITH
President
General Precision
Equipment Corporation

OFFICIAL PUBLICATION
OF THE
American Society
for
Industrial Security



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D. W. SMITH, PRESIDENT

July 1, 1961

To Members of the American Society
for Industrial Security:



In a world distorted by a fearsome conflict in ideologies, the long record of enemy-sponsored espionage and infiltration in industry requires that we apply the best measures possible to protect the secrets of our national defense. The Communist Party has been conducting an intensive program over the years of placing its members in our vital industries.

The importance to the national security of protecting classified defense information, the equal importance of protecting individual rights, is therefore, clear to each one of us. This places upon us the burden of a continuous thorough-going analysis of our own systems and procedures to assure an adequate defense against this infiltration and protect the rights of individuals.

The world has become smaller. The change has resulted in the emergence of scientific research and development of more complicated weapons to keep ahead of our potential enemies.

I am gratified to see that security administrators of American industry have banded together into a professional society, such as the American Society for Industrial Security, to help thwart the threat to security from any potential enemy and assist management to realize a direct and real benefit through a more efficient and economic administration of its security programs.

I extend my heartiest best wishes for continued success in this fine organization.

Ronald W. Smith
Ronald W. Smith,
President

Industrial Security

Vol. 5, No. 3

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W. L. FAGG
Editor

SECURING AMERICAS PRODUCTIVE STRENGTH

By LOYD WRIGHT

The American Society for Industrial Security has, in a few short years, assumed a leading role in the nation's defense. With the benefit of combined thinking and cooperative effort, security officers in all places of industry have been able to do a more effective job in protecting this country's productive strength. For its vigorous and devoted work, members of the American Society for Industrial Security have earned the commendation and gratitude of the nation as a whole. Bereft of adequate tools by lethargy in the Congress, inefficiency in the Administrative branch of Government, and hampered by unexplainable and strange court decisions, you have nevertheless carried on. I fear you are entering an era when your delicate tasks will be multiplied, in the effort to search out the insidious infiltration of Soviet agents, and those poor deluded Americans who, while not Soviets, do the bidding of the Soviets.

You will recall that a little corporal by the name of Hitler, while in prison, wrote a book called *Mein Kampf*, in which he frankly told the world what he intended to do. Unfortunately, governments did not take him seriously. Once more, we are confronted with a realistic threat in that the Soviet gangsters have repeatedly told us their objectives, and yet not only our Government, but our people generally, have not taken heed. You will recall that the Marxist Manifesto not only advocated the taking over of the working class parties throughout the world through infiltration, but also displayed a remarkable understanding of human nature when they boldly threatened economic disaster through the implementation of economic pressures in our beloved country. Some of the objectives were spelled out as follows:

(Continued on page 54)



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Burns is the world's largest



industrial security organization

...a sentinel against COMMUNISM

By ERNEST E. FELAGO

The excellent work done on the chapter level of ASIS and reported through the regional level provides a vehicle for collecting and combining thought and opinion from the entire area for consideration by the Board of Directors. Industrial security does, therefore, move forward with greatly increased effectiveness to benefit the nation's industrial system. Those who are handling industrial security responsibilities will be better equipped to discharge their duties by affiliating with ASIS. This will result in a direct and real benefit to management by a more proficient and economic administration of its security and protection departments.

Our brochure, our membership directory, and our magazine should be enough to "sell" most potential members on the value of membership. The membership directory alone is worth the full amount of the annual dues.

Everyone who becomes a member of ASIS should eventually do a much better job for his employer.

The committees are the backbone of the chapters. They are the working arm of the organization. The Board of Directors decides policy, but it must have efficient committees if policies and planning are to be put into action.

Our chapters are the lifeline of our society; they are the vehicles to that esprit de corps which is essential to any disciplined organization. I feel that chapters should have regular monthly meetings. Heretofore, some of our members regarded the society as a "group" which banded together for the purpose of holding a meeting now and then, or for a social gathering. This is not the purpose of the society. It was organized as a national professional society of industrial security men in this country. It should not be regarded as secondary to every other interest a member has, but should be placed high on the list of importance, and second only to our jobs.

Every member has a responsibility to ASIS, and should strive to enhance its growth, reputation, and professional standing. Our officers and committee-men, and chapter chairmen, have added specific and very special duties and responsibilities. They have accepted these responsibilities, and, in some instances, they are unfair to the membership in ignoring them.

If the reason for lack of activity in chapters is lack of know-how, I truly hope that advice and counsel will be sought from the officers of ASIS. I am assured of their cooperation.

The question sometimes asked by the naivete is why is so much emphasis placed on industrial security when the country is not at war. Americans must be on the alert at all times.

From here on it is important to see the whole organization in its proper perspective. It must function in the same manner that a two-way street carries traffic—with proper controls for the best interest of all. In an organization, these controls are represented by officers and the Board of Directors, for they must keep the members operating within the framework of sound concepts, as traffic must be contained in its proper lanes.

Short-term goals or objectives are the result of the proper flow of ideas. There may well be many sources for these suggestions, as any general discussion would reveal, but in the final analysis it is the responsibility of the officers and the Board of Directors to utilize every facility at their command, both to identify the most pertinent goals for immediate attention and to motivate committees to accomplish these goals once they have been clearly established.

(Continued on page 20)



Ernest E. Felago has been Director of Security for General Precision Equipment Corporation and General Precision, Inc., since 1955. He began his career in Industrial Security with the U. S. Patent Office in 1937 and remained in Government Service until 1955, when he resigned the position of Executive Secretary, Chief Security Advisor to the Department of Defense — New York, Industrial Personnel Security Board, to join GPE. Prior to that time, he held various top ranking security posts in Government service which included: Chief, Industrial Security Division, Headquarters 1st Army, Governors Island, New York; Security Specialist—Key Facilities Office of Naval Material — New York; Regional Director of Security, Economic Stabilization Agency; Assistant Special Agent-in-Charge — New York Region — Dept. of Agriculture and Office of Price Administration.

In 1955 Mr. Felago became a member of ASIS. Shortly thereafter he was elected Vice-Chairman of the New York Metropolitan Chapter. He has also held the posts of Regional Vice President, North East Region; Director; and is now a Director and First Vice President. During his tenure as a Regional Vice President, he was awarded a Certificate of Merit by the Board for establishing more Chapters in his Region than were established in any other Region.

He was graduated from the New York Technical Institute in 1936.

IS YOUR PLANT MARKED FOR SABOTAGE?

THINK BACK a little to the wave of violent industrial strikes in this country, the creeping Communist menace in some of our trade unionism. Trouble has come to others; will it come to you?

It surely will, because the Red conspiracy to enslave the free world in-

cludes you and your plant in its plans. The argument amongst the Communist "Big Two"—Khrushchev and Mao — is of means and not ends: the end remains the same, a complete take-over of the free world. This take-over will be much easier once Western industry is hamstrung and made inoperative.

How You Can Protect Yourself

It is important that you learn how the Communists operate. A sober new book, "The Naked Communist," explains how they infiltrate, organize, proceed to sabotage. There are more devious ways of taking over a plant than man normally dreams of!

In "The Naked Communist," author W. Cleon Skousen draws on his years

of experience as FBI man, and chief of police, to expose the web of communist intrigue in this country.

"The Naked Communist" is a vital book for industrial management and security officers. Read and be forewarned!

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Will The Future Redeem The Past?



Dr. Charles H. Malik, who is the former President of the United Nations General Assembly, sends this message along with his article to the Editors of INDUSTRIAL SECURITY.

"Freedom has been too much on the retreat and enslavement has had its field day for years. This is primarily due to the stupidity of the realm of freedom. Is it not time to call a halt to this shameful performance and start reversing the tide? It is not enough at all to settle for the status quo, because such a settlement will be tantamount to a defeat. Either people then will be determined to push back the dark tide of oppression, both in its Communist and in its other forms, or I am afraid Western civilization is doomed. I say these things with the deadliest possible seriousness. Some resounding defeat must be inflicted somewhere soon on the anti-Western, anti-liberal, anti-human forces, or else the momentum of the march of these forces will soon develop to an irreversible pitch. I sincerely believe the historic moment could not be more decisive."

There is something mysterious about history. The commonest reflection on history is that it does not stand still. This means that "it" "flows." What is this "it" that flows, and what is this "flowing" which seems to be inseparable from "it". These are mysterious questions. Surely there is no river in front of us that flows, and yet we immovably persist in maintaining that whatever history is, "it" is something that "moves," that "flows." We are using, therefore, an image, an analogy. I suggest that what we mean by this analogy of the "movement" or the "flow" of history is that there is something uncertain about any assessment of the past. When I make a historical judgment, "it does not stand still"; I may change it tomorrow; or even if the judgment is "immovable," its significance in history and for history may radically alter tomorrow.

I propose today to meditate briefly on the past decade or two, and to look ahead to the coming decade or two.

"History flows" or "moves on" means that history has not "yet" delivered all that with which "it" is pregnant, that history has not "come to an end," that "it" continues to be in labor and will deliver still more, that the last word, not only *about* the past that is "finished and done away with," but especially *of* the past and its "place" in the determination of the present and the future, has not "yet" been said, and that therefore the "present" meditation may have to be altered more or less appreciably one year or five years or ten years from now.

FOUR ESSENTIAL LIMITATIONS

What I say, then, must be viewed under four essential limitations. (1) I do not have all the facts

before me, not only the enormous multiplicity of known and ascertainable facts, but especially the secrets under lock and key in the archives of governments and of other organizations bearing upon history. (2) When all the facts are before me, not only will the picture be more complete in the sense of including everything, but my judgment of the nature and importance even of the known or ascertainable facts may have to undergo considerable modification. (3) Even an indisputable, disastrous fact, such as the communization of mainland China, could take on a completely different meaning in the light of future decisions and future developments. And (4) I view the decisiveness of the present moment in history as consisting in a life-and-death struggle between International Communism, not only nor even primarily as an economic system, but as a total outlook on life, and the rest of the world, especially the Western world, and in the Western world especially the United States of America.

ON SIDE OF WEST

Because of my knowledge of its ultimate positive values, as epitomized in part, for instance, in the magnificent language of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, I range myself wholly on the side of the West, despite its many imperfections, mistakes, failures, and sins. It is this fundamental conviction and my free self-ranging on one side of the life-and-death struggle that enable me, for instance, to say that the communization of mainland China was "disastrous"; and I view everything from the standpoint of this conviction and this self-ranging. Thus I agree with the following finding of the International Com-

(Continued on page 28)

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PLANT SECURITY

GENERAL ELECTRIC
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EVENDALE PLANT

By JAMES A. DAVIS

Manager—Plant Security

At General Electric's Flight Propulsion Division in Cincinnati, management has confirmed the company's belief that good industrial security is good business. This plant in suburban Evendale, producing large jet engines for military and commercial use and deep into missile-age research and development work, houses some 12,500 employees and has diversified types of classified contracts at all times. Thus, the question of national security naturally is a big one and is a primary concern in the everyday life of the facility.

Over and above the contractual security demands of its government work, GE-Evendale further recognizes it has certain economic and moral responsibilities to assure reasonable industrial protection for its employees, property, and facilities in order to prevent injury, damage, or interruption to productivity.

That's why GE-Evendale, as many other large facilities throughout the country, has developed a complete Plant Security package—not only to meet Government requirements, but to serve its own interests as well. Where you find thousands of persons gathered together for an extended period each day, such as at this 471-acre GE plant in outlying Cincinnati, you have many functions akin to those of a fair-sized town, and sound judgment dictates that you provide the same kind of protective services—fire protection, police protection, disaster planning, etc.

Let's take a look at GE's security organization in the Cincinnati plant and see how it has been structured over the past several years to cover every phase of security, in the broadest sense of the word. (As you will note from a glance at the organization chart, my staff is broken into eight separate functions).

(Continued on page 51)




Top—Security patrolman checking contents of employee's package at exit gate.

Center—Orientation sessions and educational material help assure security awareness among Evendale employees.

Bottom—Visual aids used in promotion of Plant Security Program.



"Secret Spy" or



"Regular Guy"?

The "regular guy" could be as much a security risk as the more obvious "spy type", without even realizing it!

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INDUSTRIAL SECURITY and the...

ARSONIST

By ROBERT J. BOISE — Security Dept., Ford Motor Company



the smallest spark, can rekindle itself to a fire of catastrophic proportions.

With this in mind, I shall try to do three things in this article: First, I shall draw some distinctions between industrial arson and that found in the community; second, I shall comment upon the advantages of built-in arson protection; and, third, I shall discuss the investigation techniques used by industry and local fire enforcement officials. I shall conclude with a case study from Ford Motor Company files that illustrates, I think, a comprehensive arson detection and apprehension program.

Arson in a large industrial plant differs in significant respects from arson found outside of industry. For one thing, industrial arson is a great deal rarer. The Detroit Police and Fire Department, for example, reports that Detroit has an average of 30 arson cases to every 1,000 reportable fires, or an incidence of three per cent. Ford Motor Company statistics, on the other hand, show only one arson case to every 1,000 reportable fires, or an incidence of one-tenth of one per cent. I cite these statistics to show that there is a difference in the frequency of arson and not to imply that industry dismisses arson as a rare—and therefore negligible—phenomenon. This is

Industry takes loss by fire extremely seriously. We recognize fire for exactly what it is: an enemy without pity, conscience or fear; an enemy that doesn't care whose property it destroys, whose business it ruins, whose body it maims or whose life it takes. We see fire as an enemy that refuses to give up. One that, even when beaten to

not the case, and, as I shall probably say again and again, "arson in industry is rare—but ruinous."

The Arsonist's Motive

Another difference between industrial and community arson is the arsonist's motive. Many cases of community arson grow out of attempts at insurance fraud or other unlawful reimbursement. This is sometimes true of the small businessman who suddenly finds himself insolvent or near bankruptcy. In a large corporation, however, this motive is almost non-existent; companies, being incorporated, put paid-off claims in the company treasury and don't distribute them to individual employees. Large companies also take extensive precautions against wholesale, runaway fires, making the prospects for profit-by-arson dim indeed.

We also find that, in the community, arson is often committed for revenge. Persons who feel that they have been discriminated against, or who have a generalized resentment toward their neighbors, landlord, or even their fiancee, sometimes turn to arson. But they do it at home and not on the job.

It is true that employees sometimes destroy parts and components—often during a large layoff or an unpopular disciplinary action—but they seldom resort to fire. Sabotage cases are less an act of revenge than they are a demonstration of disapproval. In fact, we can't recall a single case of arson in our plants in which the sole motive was revenge.

There's another difference between the community and industrial arsonist that I should mention. The community arsonist sometimes sets fire to buildings and objects in an effort to conceal evidence of another crime. By contrast, we rarely find this motive in industry.

There is, however, an arsonist that is common to both the community and industry—one that deserves

(Continued on page 41)



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WHILE DIVERSIFYING into many fields of space-age technology, North American Aviation has maintained its leadership in advanced manned aircraft. For over 5 years North American has been at work in the Mach 3 area of manned flight, and is currently building the Free World's first Mach 3 jet aircraft, the Air Force's B-70 Valkyrie.

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THE IACP FIELD SERVICE DIVISION

A New Venture in Police Security

By QUINN TAMM — Director of the IACP Field Service Division



The International Association of Chiefs of Police, the nation's largest and most influential professional association of police executives and administrators, was formally established in 1893. Its beginnings were modest, the first "annual meeting" being attended by 51 chiefs who gathered for the purpose in Chicago. The declared purpose of the meet-

ing was "to discuss matters of mutual interest, evolve methods of cooperation between municipal police departments in the suppression of crime and apprehension of criminals, and to form a voluntary association of police executives to meet at intervals." The association has met every year since then, with the single exception of 1917, and now has an active membership of over 4,000 executives and administrators from the United States, Canada, and twenty countries outside the American continent.

The association has standing committees on Legislation, Arson, Automobile Theft, Crime Prevention, Civil Defense, International Relations, Education and Training, Public Relations, Traffic, Communications, Radio, Television, and Motion Pictures, Research, and Uniform Crime Reporting. Through the work of these groups, it stays in touch with the latest developments in the major problems of policing. Each of the committees presents a comprehensive report of its work and findings at the association's annual convention.

In 1959 the IACP fulfilled a plan long in the making—to establish a Field Service Division, providing within the structure of the association a group of professionals experienced in police problems, along with experts from related fields, with the purpose of making available to all American police agencies the finest possible assistance in all phases of police management and operations. On request from chiefs of departments, Field Service Division staff personnel are assigned to study police departments and their operations. This may cover administrative, technical, or operational matters, or all three, depending upon the need.

The Growing Police Problem

The long-standing need for such an agency in the police field is obvious. It is a well known fact that the problems confronted by the police are growing rapidly, both in number and complexity. With new developments in transportation and communication, along with the explosive growth of population, the concentrations of population have become denser, and great metropolitan areas have become more numerous. All this increases the breeding ground for crime and violation of the law.

At the same time, the resources available to police agencies and other organizations with security responsibilities have not increased at anything like the same rate. The assumption is always present that *the police will always be sufficient for the task*, no matter how great the task may be!

This assumption results, of course, from the fact that, in general, the police *have* been sufficient for their tasks, though this sufficiency has been achieved in the face of enormous difficulties. Some of these are already noted above, and they will surely continue to develop. Alongside of these factors in the growth of American life, American police forces have had to compete with private industry and other pursuits in a very uneven struggle to secure dedicated and competent manpower. Today's police problems make it absolutely necessary that our police forces be manned increasingly by personnel of exceptional intelligence and capacity for developing skills and abilities of a high order, in addition to the traditional police requirements of physique and moral integrity. But men of such outstanding qualities are able, of course, to demand jobs which pay off much more "handsomely" than police service, and they usually do. Our police agencies have been able in recent years to secure some gradual improvement in salary scales and other benefits for their personnel. But these improvements have been hard won, and they have not come in anything like the same proportion as have the increases in corresponding emoluments in business and industry.

What can be done to offset these disparities is a problem today of critical dimensions. Police departments, partly with their own resources and partly with assistance from various interested institutions,

(Continued on page 22)



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
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SECURITY • education & • enforcement



By R. J. GODDARD

Manager, Security - General Office
Hughes Aircraft Company

A defense contractor is required, by terms of his contract, to safeguard classified information in accordance with prescribed standards. While there is no explicit reference in the ISM to "Security Education" or "Security Enforcement," it is apparent that a system of adequate controls must be predicated on knowledge, understanding, and fulfillment of the Government's requirements.

This is a subject conceptually basic and simple, yet complex and frustrating in its application. After 20 years experience in the law and security enforcement fields, I have reached the conclusion that it is meaningless to try to implement a security education program apart from a security enforcement program—i.e., a system of sanctions and penalties. Security indoctrination and training are merely a means to an end; the underlying objective is to assure compliance with the requirements. Security regulations do not guarantee protection any more than laws guarantee an absence of crime. Stated differently, the best laws and regulations are worthless unless there is obedience to them.

What counts is an active and persistent pursuit of desired objectives, consistent with facts and circumstances, in such a manner that company-wide compliance becomes an accepted standard and deviations therefrom are rare and explainable exceptions rather than the rule.

STEPS TO COMPLIANCE

Achievement of these objectives, therefore, involves: First, knowledge and understanding of the requirements. Second, recognition on the part of the person concerned that he has an individual responsibility for complying with the requirements; and finally, assurance that each person, armed with such knowledge, is sufficiently motivated to perform his responsibilities and otherwise comply with the requirements.

In this regard it is apparent that knowledge is only half the battle. The other half—and we'll call it "motivation"—has to be geared simultaneously to an adequate, yet reasonable, enforcement program. Why? Because the employees we really are concerned about, namely the disinterested and/or unwary, while in the minority, commit most of the offenses—and frequently commit the most serious offenses. How to engender a proper understanding of, and wholesome respect for, security on the part of these employees is the subject of this discussion.

If *indoctrination* is instruction in the principles of learning, or a branch of learning; if *training* means instructing and educating; and *enforcement* means to give strength or power to an endeavor, then it seemingly follows that *discipline* is the keystone of any effective educational program. Then too, I would add another magic ingredient—*orientation*. Security

(Continued on page 47)



A former Special Agent of the FBI and World War II Security Officer, Mr. Goddard joined Hughes in January 1951 and for eight years prior to his present position, was Manager of Personnel Security—with immediate responsibility for all investigations at Hughes. His many years in the law-security enforcement fields, coupled with his extensive training background and wide membership in Security organizations, have contributed to a keen interest in, and understanding of, the problems and patterns associated with security violations. As Manager of Security - General Office, Mr. Goddard is functionally responsible for development, implementation, and surveillance of the company-wide Security programs.



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Resolution

Whereas: A SOCIETY WHICH RESPECTS CIVIL LIBERTY REALIZES THAT THE FREEDOM OF ITS PEOPLE DEPENDS ON THEIR PRIVACY AND THE SAFEGUARDING OF THEIR LIVES AND PROPERTY, AND

Whereas: THE BILL OF RIGHTS IS A PROMISE OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM FROM GOVERNMENT CONTROL REQUIRING THE ENERGY OF GOVERNMENT TO SUSTAIN, AND

Whereas: A NATION WISE IN THE WAYS OF FREEDOM ENCOURAGES ITS PEOPLE TO BE ALERT, TO BE RESPONSIVE, AND TO BE AGGRESSIVE IN DEALING WITH ANY CHALLENGE TO ITS FREEDOM, AND ITS SECURITY, AND

Whereas: THE ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CITIZENS IN THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF BRINGING OUT INTO THE ARENA OF PUBLIC DEBATE, EVIDENCE BEARING ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES OF INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM, IN CARRYING OUT ITS LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE, AND

Whereas: TO DENY TO THE PEOPLE THE SUBSTANCE BASIC TO THOUGHT IS TO DENY THEM THEIR RIGHTS OF EXPRESSION AND PETITION, AND

Whereas: SUCH DENIAL ALSO WITHHOLDS FROM THE GOVERNMENT THE NURTURE THAT COMES FROM INDIVIDUAL EXPRESSION WHICH IS THE PECULIAR STRENGTH OF OUR SOCIETY, AND

Whereas: WIDESPREAD PUBLIC DISCUSSION AND COMMUNICATION IS THE ONE GREAT WEAPON AGAINST TOTALITARIANISM OF ANY FORM, AND

Whereas: THE FIRST AMENDMENT INHERENTLY ASSUMES THE RESPONSIBILITY OF INDIVIDUAL CITIZENS TO KNOW AND TO THINK INDEPENDENTLY, FORMING HIS JUDGMENTS FOR HIMSELF, IN SOLVING THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL PROBLEMS OF HIS TIME, AND

Whereas: THE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE AND ITS SUB-COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF SENATOR JAMES O. EASTLAND OF MISSISSIPPI; AND THE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF CONGRESSMAN FRANCIS E. WALTER OF PENNSYLVANIA, HAVE PERFORMED A GREAT SERVICE TO THE ENLIGHTENMENT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,

Be It Therefore Resolved: THAT THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY GO ON RECORD AS APPROVING THE CONTINUATION OF THE SENATE SUB-COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY AND THE HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE, AND

Be It Further Resolved: THAT THESE COMMITTEES CONTINUE TO BRING OUT INTO THE ARENA OF PUBLIC DEBATE, THE TRUE FACTS IN ORDER THAT ALL CITIZENS MIGHT KNOW OF THE DANGERS FACING THEM FROM WHATEVER SOURCE, AND

Be It Further Resolved: THAT THESE COMMITTEES BE GIVEN FURTHER LATITUDE AND AUTHORITY BY THE CONGRESS TO DISSEMINATE THEIR REPORTS TO ALL SCHOOLS, COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE, FOR IN THE EDUCATION OF ITS PEOPLE LIES THE SAFETY OF OUR COUNTRY, AND

Be It Further Resolved: THAT COPIES OF THIS RESOLUTION BE SENT TO THE PRESIDENT, THE VICE-PRESIDENT, THE CABINET, MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, AND THAT IT BE PRINTED IN THE NEXT ISSUE OF THE OFFICIAL MAGAZINE OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY.

APPROVED BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY, THIS 23RD DAY OF MAY, 1961, AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN.

CERTIFIED: /s/ W. L. Fagg

W. L. FAGG
Executive Director - ASIS

Resolution

Be It Resolved BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY THAT VIRGIL L. COUCH BE, AND HEREBY IS, COMMENDED FOR HIS SERVICES TO THIS ORGANIZATION AND BE, AND HEREBY IS, RECOGNIZED AS A DISTINGUISHED PROFESSIONAL FOR HIS CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY FIELD.

THE SOCIETY IS INDEBTED TO VIRGIL L. COUCH AND IS SINCERELY APPRECIATIVE OF HIS OUTSTANDING EFFORTS FOR, AND HIS DEVOTION TO, ITS STATED PURPOSES IN THAT HE INSTITUTED A BETTER, MORE REALISTIC, MORE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT INDUSTRIAL DEFENSE PROGRAM FOR NONMILITARY DEFENSE.

THE SOCIETY RECOGNIZES VIRGIL L. COUCH AS AN OUTSTANDING, SELFLESS AND DEDICATED PUBLIC SERVANT WHO HAS MADE NOTABLE CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE NATION IN HIS PRESENT CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR, INDUSTRY OFFICE, OFFICE OF CIVIL AND DEFENSE MOBILIZATION.

THE SOCIETY SALUTES VIRGIL L. COUCH FOR HIS TIRELESS EFFORTS IN FURTHERING THE CAUSE OF INDUSTRIAL SECURITY GENERALLY, AND FOR STRENGTHENING BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY TO THE POINT OF THEIR BEING BETTER PREPARED TO RESIST A BOMBING OR BALLISTIC MISSILE ATTACK OR FROM NATURAL DISASTERS OF ANY NATURE.

Approved BY THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR INDUSTRIAL SECURITY AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN, MAY 23, 1961.

CERTIFIED: /s/ W. L. Fagg

W. L. FAGG
Executive Director - ASIS

A Sentinel Against Communism (*Continued*)

Committees are only needed if they fit into the framework of long-term planning or short-term goals. In the first instance, they may be permanent standing committees. In the latter case, they may be classified as special and thus serve only as long as a specific need for their function exists.

ASIS has emerged from its original embryonic status as a subordinate industrial relations activity into a major administrative function within our defense industry and within those areas which directly or indirectly support our defense efforts.

The mere fact that we have an American Society for Industrial Security and that our membership has this month passed the 2200 mark lends strong support to the fact that:

1. Industrial security is a permanent high-level administrative function within defense industry;
2. Defense industry is a permanent integral part of the American industrial scene;
3. A new profession is emerging in this country to meet the challenge and the need that industrial management now faces to staff adequately its industrial security departments on a par with its engineering, production, financial departments, its contracts administration, industrial and public relations, and other key top level operating units.

Many in top management positions in the defense industry are assuming that because they hired security officers to write industrial security manuals, to work with our counterparts in the various agencies of Federal Government and the Armed Forces, to make background investigations on our employees, to insist that badges are worn, and that military secrets are not written in personal letters; they have discharged their industrial security obligations.

You know as well as I do nothing could be further from the truth. In many ways like public relations and personnel relations, good industrial security is a matter of frame of mind.

Before we can implement its operating details and expect our hundreds of thousands of defense industry employees to live up to its exacting requirements, we must demand that our top management, our senior executives, our department heads and supervisors pay more than lip service to security and to the theme that President Eisenhower stated in a recent issue of our magazine, that *"it is vital that our plants and lines of communications be made secure from all potential hazards."*

Security in itself is not the goal. But security in order that we may protect ourselves from our potential enemies, and that we may develop technical knowledge and keep it from those enemies while we are building our own weapons of defense, is what we should all keep before us.

As recently stated by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, considerable volume of the anticapitalist animus in America and throughout the world has been inspired by communist propaganda. This fact, however, should not cause us to label every critic as a Communist. Some critics are sincere, out to improve capitalism (which it can always stand), and they may be worth listening to. Many of them, nevertheless, are fuzzy-minded, incapable of distinguishing between defects of capitalism and defects under capitalism.

But because of the important role played by Communists and their fellow-travellers in undermining faith in capitalism, a word more needs saying on why people turn anticapitalist and join the communist cause—particularly people in positions of influence and leadership.

The motivation of Communists and their followers is extremely complex. With a few, it is a perverted form of idealism, a worldly substitute for religion. Some people are personally maladjusted and are chronic rebels. The communist movement gives them an outlet. Many become Communists as a reaction against abuses, real or imagined, in the present social and political order. In particular, many Communists are rebels against one or another form of exploitation. In certain cases, their conversion may be traced to some bitter experience in the labor field. Others may have felt discrimination because they were members of minority groups. To such persons, communism is preached as a doctrine which promises equality to all.

Many "intellectuals" have been won over to communism on the basis of rosy accounts of life in the Soviet Union. These persons may be aware of faults under our own system and have been led to believe that in Russia none of these evils exists. When the faults of communism are called to their attention, they either dismiss the charges as capitalist propaganda, or else consider them as transitional evils to be overlooked in the great promise of the future. The urge to remake the world is strong among some intellectuals. Some are sufficiently detached from everyday life to be indifferent to the cruel sufferings of the so-called "transitional" period.

Other motives are less creditable. Some individuals in civic and labor politics cultivate the support of a disciplined minority. They know the value of the publicity which it affords. Such persons follow the Communist Party from motives of expediency rather than conviction. In other cases, vanity may suffice. This is particularly true of highly talented or trained specialists who feel their inadequacy in broader affairs. A scientist or a motion picture star is often highly flattered in being asked to address a political meeting. In Hollywood, Communists arranged a meeting of motion picture stars and scientists, each group attracted by the prospect of meeting the other. This technique of using celebri-

ties has been widely practiced, particularly in building up anti-capitalist "fronts."

Finally, many so-called liberals follow the communist line through confused good will. Some persons are so busy attempting to do good that they fail to realize the harm their efforts cause. These are the "joiners," who readily give their names to any organization whose apparent purpose is noble. Thus the president of a great state university became affiliated with some twenty such communist "fronts." Actually, in scores of cases such "names" and their money are used to promote communist causes. The Party has even enlisted persons of wealth to support its causes through the medium of these "front" groups. Even a casual study of the power and influence of communist "fronts" should dispel the notion that the Party has been weak and ineffectual in undermining faith in American principles and capitalism.

We in the administration of security must not let these things happen to our associates who look to us for guidance. We can increase our own skills by becoming active in chapter and regional meeting

groups where these items are discussed in detail by knowledgeable members, or by lectures delivered by experts in the field.

It is incumbent upon each of us to participate actively in ASIS chapter meetings, so that management can rely on us to assure that its employees remain devoid of any pinkish tint, whether acquired consciously or unconsciously. If we accomplish this, we shall have made a significant contribution as members of the management team.

In accordance with a request submitted to the National Office by Robert W. Fox, Lt. Col., USAF, Professor Albert Rose, University of Dayton, is hereby given credit for the preparation of the material which appeared in the April issue of INDUSTRIAL SECURITY under the title "The Red Climax."

Editor



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A New Venture in Police Security (*Continued*)

public and private, have made some important progress. The quantity and quality of professional and technical training has been remarkably increased, but nowhere near enough. The crucial importance of our police departments is being more generally recognized and their prestige increased, but nowhere near enough. The degree of coordination and cooperation between related government functions is increasing, but nowhere near enough. Improvement along these lines is much less than is required by the growth of crime, juvenile delinquency, accidents and death on the highways, and so on.

In other words, the gap between the growing police job and the police resources for dealing with it is constantly getting wider. And, with their present resources and the rate of enlargement of these remaining constant, the police must inevitably "fall farther behind" in meeting the demands for their services.

Adding to the overall problem is a very important and inviolable American tradition. This relates to the establishment of any central national police power, to which the American people are unalterably opposed. The merits of this tradition are incalculable in relation to the preservation of our traditional democratic freedoms. No tyrant has ever been successful for long without direct control of the police.

On the other hand, while our people would not depart from this tradition—nor would our police—it brings with it certain shortcomings which are much more acute under the circumstances we have been describing here. Centralization of authority and direction, along with centralization of records, communications and other staff services, and uniformity of policies and procedures, would offset many of the current problems which tend to make the nation's police less uniformly efficient and their operations less economical and productive than they might otherwise be.

So the problem, then, is to provide American policing and security forces with as many of the benefits of nationalization as possible, without in fact creating a national force with all its attendant evils. The means to this end can be stated in a single word: *cooperation*. It is to achieve effective cooperation that the International Association of Chiefs of Police carries on its work and program today.

The Program of the Field Service Division

It is a fact that, with all its other responsibilities, and with the day-to-day demands for service that already overtax its capacities, no police department, state or city, can afford to divert enough attention to thorough study of the problems that confront it, its own internal operations and management, and to the development of improved techniques, methods, and procedures. It is for this reason that the Inter-

national Association of Chiefs of Police has launched the work of its new Field Service Division.

Thus the association has created a concrete means of putting its original purposes and goals into effect. By researching the problems relating to the policing of the modern city, by developing the most up-to-date methods and procedures for the operation of an effective police department, by bringing together and organizing the latest information on selection and recruitment, testing and training of personnel, and by providing the benefits of this program, at cost, to police agencies "on demand," the IACP is creating a new and sound uniformity along with new standards of excellence for the entire police field. The potential improvements thus made possible for the future are immeasurable.

The beginning of the Field Service Division came with the decision of the association to move its Traffic Division from Evanston, Illinois, to Washington, D. C. This organization, in cooperation with the Traffic Institute of Northwestern University, had for 24 years provided training and other services to police departments and other official agencies in connection with the supervision of motor vehicle traffic. Thus, in the area of traffic, the nucleus of the new organization had already had enormous and valuable experience in assisting departments in the improvement of their programs.

Consultative Services

The "main-line" activity of the organization is the provision of direct assistance to the chiefs of departments. The association makes a very important point of the fact that this is not primarily "a survey-making organization." It operates on the general theory that direct assistance in the installation of improved systems and ideas is the way to deliver the "greatest value for the customer's dollar." Thus, while a survey may be made in a department and community, and a report of the survey submitted, the *end product* goes beyond this phase in direct help to the chief.

The staff of the Division is experienced, of course, in evaluating administrative and organizational arrangements in the police field. At the request of the chief of a department, a staff representative, or representatives, visits the department for purposes of discussion with the chief and his staff, and to make preliminary observations and evaluations of the department's operations. On this basis, the need for assistance and the kinds of assistance that are required are decided upon jointly by our staff and the department chief.

It may be, of course, that a department is not able to budget all the changes and improvements required at a given time. In such a case, another service of the Field Service Division is to advise with

(Continued on page 24)

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A New Venture in Police Security (*Continued*)

the chief on the best way to plan and schedule the required services "a little at a time." Decisions are made about which work should be done first, which will benefit the department most, and similar matters. In some cases, it may be determined that a "series" of projects, occupying two weeks a year for several years, for example, is advisable. The services to a department are "tailor-made" to meet its particular needs in every respect.

In many respects, the Field Service Division functions as a management consulting agency—dealing with the problems of organization and administration, planning and installing improved reporting and records systems and systems of communications, and studying and improving personnel programs.

The improvement of reporting and records systems is one of the outstanding needs for effective police work in this country. The benefits of this are two-fold: (1) Effective reporting of criminal activity and other matters of police concern enables an administrator to evaluate the current police problem of his community, and also the performance and productivity of his force. (2) Well organized records, properly analyzed, allow police leadership to "spot trends" and anticipate new problems before they reach the dimensions of crises. In addition to these more immediate benefits, effective crime reporting is a means of interdepartmental cooperation in the control of criminal activity and criminals.

The Field Service Division is currently developing reports and records systems appropriate for application in departments of various size communities. The goal of this aspect of our program, of course, is ultimately to establish uniform practices in the classifying and reporting of all police activities. This accomplishment, in itself, will effect incalculable improvement in the effectiveness of police work.

The usefulness and effectiveness of records and records analysis is vastly increased with the speeding up of processing made possible by the use of the "miraculous" new data-processing equipment, including card-punchers, sorters, computers, etc. It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of this type of equipment or the extent of its productive application in the processing of records. The staff of the Field Service Division includes accomplished experts in the uses and applications of such machinery. While this kind of equipment is costly, and cannot be acquired by many departments, an increasing number of communities have data-processing "centers" which provide services and equipment on a commercial basis.

The Division is long-experienced in providing professional training at all levels—administrative, technical, and operational. It is prepared to send staff personnel into a department to plan and conduct training programs. It is also prepared to assist departments in the development of staff and program

for their own intra-departmental programs. As in its other services, the division adapts the character of the service to the particular need. The training is tailor-made in each case to meet the situation. A department may need training for personnel to put a new records system into effect, or it may want to improve the quality of investigation of traffic accidents. It may want to train some personnel in the use of mechanical devices such as lie detectors or equipment for testing degrees of intoxication. On the other hand, a two-week course may be needed for a larger department in supervision methods for sergeants and lieutenants. The decision on the character of the program needed is arrived at on the basis of the requirements of the individual chief.

Research and Development

The Field Service Division is also committed to an extensive program of basic research relating to major police problems. This program ties in with the work of the association's new standing committee on police research. These activities are indicative of a new determination to organize the resources of the association for the systematic study and analysis of policing's big problems, and the development of better methods and procedures.

Currently in progress is a three-year study into the effects of traffic law enforcement by the police on the behavior of drivers. This study is being conducted under a contract with the United States Public Health Service of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, at a cost of \$209,515. Commenting on the study, Ray Ashworth, first director of the Field Service Division, said:

"Each year in the United States it is estimated that there is in excess of \$100 million spent directly on traffic law enforcement, yet very little is really known about the way or the degree to which enforcement affects driving behavior. As a result, there is very little basis for determining what enforcement methods will bring about the greatest results in efficient flow of traffic and in the reduction of accidents. There are no reliable means for determining the potential accomplishments of enforcement or for making objective judgments about the amount and kind of enforcement that will produce optimum results for the money expended."


"The lack of detailed understanding of the enforcement process produces many practical problems. Legislatures and budget bureaus are repeatedly called upon to make decisions concerning amounts of money to be spent on traffic law enforcement as against other traffic supervision activities. Police administrators are faced with the need to make decisions on the deployment of manpower to get maximum results in accident reduction. Thus far these decisions must be made without the fullest possible information to go on. We are confident that this study will enable us to lay the basis for determining realistically

(Continued on page 26)

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A New Venture in Police Security (Continued)

the best enforcement techniques and the most economical applications of police manpower to our growing traffic problems."

The specific aims of the study are to determine the kinds of enforcement symbols most productive of desirable driving behavior; the kinds of driver behavior evoked by various enforcement symbols; the rate at which certain behavioral responses diminish; the frequency of observing enforcement symbols required for permanent desirable changes in behavior; the frequency with which enforcement symbols must be 'reinforced' by arrest, citation, warning, etc.; the probability that certain kinds of driving behavior will lead to accidents.

In effect, the purpose of the research program of the new IACP Field Service Division is, as is the purpose of all sound research, to observe and evaluate problems and what is being done about them; to determine by systematic experimentation the effects of what is being done, and to modify what is being done in such a way as to effect improvement. This kind of experimentation involves large amounts of time, and it is costly. No single police department can do enough of it to arrive at ideal results. It is confidently hoped that the IACP may be able to do this kind of work continuously through its Field Service Division, and subsequently make the results available to all departments.

Obviously the police administrator must screen and select personnel with the greatest possible care. The qualities that make good police officers are quite exceptional, in the true sense of that term, and they promise to be even more so as time goes on. In an effort to cope with this problem in some concrete way, the IACP's Field Service Division is planning a thoroughgoing study and analysis of police personnel. In connection with the project, present personnel practices will be looked into in detail; screening, selection, testing, promotion, and other related procedures will be evaluated in the light of their observable results. The careers and performance of police officers will be studied with a view to determining the adequacies and inadequacies of selection and recruitment in relation to actual performance.

"What is it that makes a good police officer?" This is the unwieldy \$64,000 question that must be answered if departments are to be able to determine with any degree of certainty that Joe Brown will be any better officer in the long run than Charley Green, and thus be assured of recruiting the best from a limited supply of police candidates.

We may say with certainty that a policeman in the New York City Police Department does not necessarily need the same qualities in order to be successful, as does a trooper on the Wisconsin State Patrol, as does a deputy sheriff in Shelby County, Tennessee. To the extent that this is true we should not be surprised that any test or other device exhibits

only highly variable success in the prediction of personnel performance in these differing situations.

We hope to determine in the course of this study the most important elements in the structure of the policeman's job, in terms which define the qualities required for its successful performance. We hope from this to develop a selection and testing procedure that will greatly increase the degree of certainty with which police personnel are selected, and that will therefore make this difficult task easier for the entire police field.

The information we gather and organize in connection with this project is also likely to be of great value in areas other than personnel selection and placement. Training needs, for example, must be investigated more realistically; sound standards must be set for continuous evaluation of personnel and promotion procedures.

Here again, the International Association of Chiefs of Police is attempting to make up for the average police department's lack of resources to do many of the jobs that need doing in the improvement of police services. By concentrating the new and increasing resources of its Field Service Division on such major problems as these, the association anticipates being able to do a substantial job from which all departments will benefit, at minimum cost to all involved.

Conclusion

The potential benefits of the services of this new arm of the International Association of Chiefs of Police are quite beyond measure. With this direct approach to the most pressing current needs of our police agencies through consultation, study, and assistance, we hope to enable all police administrators to upgrade the work of their organizations at reasonable cost.

There is great promise in the fact that this organization has been embraced by the IACP as an organic part of the organization's own program. Thus it is assured that these services will meet the high professional standards of the association, and will be provided to the field with no other motive save to benefit the police profession.

We look forward to a continuation of the organization's further growth and effectiveness. We plan to continue building its staff and resources commensurate with the highest possible standards.

Mr. Quinn Tamm, Director of the Field Service Division, International Association of Chiefs of Police, is a native of Seattle, Washington. He received his early education in Butte, Montana, and is a graduate of the University of Virginia.

Mr. Tamm is a retired Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He served as Assistant Director of three separate divisions of the FBI—the Identification Division, the Laboratory, and the Training and Inspection Division.

Married and the father of two sons, he now resides in Chevy Chase, Maryland.

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Will the Future Redeem the Past? (Continued)

unist congress which gathered together in Moscow in November of 1957 for the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the Russian October Revolution, and which was attended by delegates from sixty-five Communist parties representing a total membership all over the world of thirty-three million: that the international stage is the scene today "of the competition between two diametrically opposed . . . world outlooks, . . . the Marxist-Leninist dialectical materialism," on the one hand, and every other outlook, on the other. (*Pravda*, November 22, 1957.) General de Gaulle, one of the authoritative voices of the West, recently said: "The division of the peoples that inhabit Europe and North America is the main fact and the worst evil of our time. Two camps are set up, face to face, under conditions such that it depends solely on Moscow or Washington whether or not a large part of humanity is wiped out in a few hours."

A BALANCE SHEET

Under these four limitations we may now work out a provisional balance sheet of the last two decades. On the credit side, the free world, and especially the West, can congratulate itself on a number of things. Fascism has been routed. There has been a remarkable European recovery, thanks partly to the Marshall Plan, partly and in the first instance to the vigor of the European peoples themselves with their great economic, political, and spiritual institutions. The Atlantic Alliance has forged the most important unity of purpose and strength in the face of Communism in the world. From the point of view of preparedness, the West, despite the sensational achievements of the Soviet Union, is relatively very strong. The greater part of Germany appears to be permanently integrated into the West. The advance of Communism is halted and slightly reversed in France and Italy. From the point of view of military alignment, Yugoslavia is detached from Moscow. Despite constant sources of danger, both internal and external, Greece and Turkey, thanks in part to the Truman Doctrine, have not been overrun or neutralized. Communism has so far been prevented from spilling over into Iran. Japan has considerably recovered, and despite Communist agitation and infiltration, Japan remains an ally of the West.

DEFENSIVE ALLIANCES

The defensive alliances in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia stand as watchful guardians against the advance of Communism in their areas. The domain of freedom, so far as national liberation is concerned, has considerably increased through the emergence of Asia and Africa into independent nationhood. Generous programs of technical and economic assistance developed by the United States and other countries, and to a small extent by the United Nations

also, have helped in easing the lot of the less fortunate and promoting their peaceful development. The end of the Stalinist tyranny is an important event in the total sweep of history. There is a more widespread understanding in the free world of the nature and goals of Communism than ever before through the immense literature that has lately poured forth on this subject, and through the increasing interest that the universities and schools are taking in it.

Events in the Far East, in Asia, in the Middle East, and in Eastern Europe have opened the eyes of many people to the real facts of life with respect to international Communism. Marxist predictions have been scandalously belied so far as the resiliency and increasing prosperity of the free world, and especially of the West, is concerned. Despite its normal inner strains, democracy is flourishing at least in Western Europe and in North America. The United Nations has not broken up; it includes now practically everybody, and disputes and situations can be debated in its halls, and world public opinion could have some effect upon them. Increasing cultural and other exchanges between East and West have contributed to a climate of greater understanding and trust. Despite the local flare-ups here and there, general peace has been maintained throughout the world.

SOLID ACHIEVEMENTS

These are solid achievements. When one closely and fully considers each one of them, one can obtain real hope and comfort. The free world has not been altogether passive and remiss during these years; on the contrary, it manifested alertness, responsibility, imagination, and bold thinking. A general awakening has, since the Second World War, resulted in building up a complex international machinery for the defense of the free world. If this was the only record of the last two decades so far as the gigantic world struggle of the moment is concerned, then the outlook for this struggle would be altogether hopeful and bright from the point of view of the West.

THE DEBIT SIDE

However, we must face on the debit side a series of depressing facts. *Communism started from zero forty-three years ago, and today it rigidly controls one-third of mankind and has penetrated and softened up in varying degrees the remaining two-thirds;* was this phenomenal development inevitable? The victory of Communism in the late forties in China means that the largest compactly homogeneous mass of humanity, numbering some 600 million people, are now sworn enemies of everything free and Western; was this development inevitable? The Korean War, despite all its heroic exertions, ended in a draw; was this outcome inevitable? In Southeast Asia there has occurred during the last ten years an advance of Communism and a retreat of freedom; was this advance and

(Continued on page 30)

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
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
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Will the Future Redeem the Past? (Continued)

retreat inevitable? Whereas international Communism was effectively absent from the Middle East ten or fifteen years ago, and in the consideration of Middle Eastern problems Communism was treated as though it did not exist, international Communism enters decisively today into the determination of every Middle Eastern problem; was this development inevitable? Whereas ten or fifteen years ago Communism was effectively absent from Latin America, today it is visibly present; was this development inevitable? The Communist Party, receiving orders directly from Moscow, is certainly more active and influential today in Asia and Africa than ten years ago, and several responsible United States officials said recently that the Communists have markedly intensified their activity in the United States; was this penetration inevitable?

THE COMMUNIST PARTY

Backing international Communism as its embodiment and vehicle is the most superbly organized international political party in history, the Communist Party, with the most advanced techniques of intellectual, social, economic, and political penetration and subversion ever devised; was the impotence of the West in developing any comparable counter-force inevitable? Backing international Communism materially is the second most industrially advanced state in the world, the Soviet Union, which might at the present rate of development surpass the United States in two decades; was this discrepancy in the rates of growth, and in the rates of change of the rates of growth, between East and West inevitable?

This supporting industrial base appears to command atomic and nuclear weapons in abundance, whereas ten or fifteen years ago the United States had a monopoly of these weapons; was this decline in Western relative strength inevitable? While the West has made enormous advances in rocketry, it is not clear that in this revolutionary technological field it has caught up with the Soviet Union so far as thrust power is concerned; is this persistent lag inevitable? In the matter of economic international competition there is no comparison between the economic status of the Communist world today and its status ten years ago; was this decline in Western relative economic strength inevitable?

THE WESTERN RETREAT

The visible struggle appears to occur all on this side of the Iron and Bamboo Curtains: in Europe, in the Middle East, in Southeast Asia, in the Far East, in Latin America; and when people expect a crisis to break out tomorrow, they do not expect it in Albania or Rumania or Russia or China, but in the home of freedom; freedom, then, is on the defensive, and not Communism. Is it fated that the West should be always on the defensive, always reacting? The West

today appears gladly to welcome neutralism in areas in which it would not have countenanced this phenomenon a decade ago; was this constant retreat of Western influence inevitable? In the nascent nationalism of Asia and Africa, which is otherwise a natural and good thing, there is an admixture in varying degrees of anti-Westernism, if not pro-Communism that leads to anti-Westernism; was this spread of anti-Westernism as a concomitant of the growth of nationalism inevitable? In the very nations that have attained the dignity of political freedom and independence other dimensions of freedom have been severely curtailed, namely, personal freedom, intellectual freedom, social freedom, spiritual freedom; was this contraction of the domain of freedom inevitable?

Communist literature has during this decade inundated Asia, Africa, and Latin America in relation to non-Communist literature; was this advance in the relative abundance of Communist literature inevitable? Communism has been more persistent and effective in presenting to the Asian and African mind a well-thought-out interpretation of existence—the Marxist-Leninist ideology—than any outlook that has been forthcoming from the West; was this timidity in the articulation of the ideology of freedom inevitable? The apparent unity of purpose and action among the international Communists impresses the Asian and African mind, whereas the squabbles among the members of the Western family produce an air of internal division and weakness; were these squabbles and divisions inevitable?

AN IRRESTIBLE TIDE?

The simple fact that the free world has not succeeded in forty years in pushing back the tide of Communism by one inch from where it really got political control leaves the strong impression that we are here dealing with an irresistible and irreversible thrust which will inevitably inherit and transform in its own image all the kingdoms and cultures of the earth; is this creeping tide of Communism completely irreversible? Perhaps the most distressing fact is the self-satisfaction and self-congratulation that prevails in the West—the softness, the laxity, the lack of determination and decisiveness, the general decadence, the uncritical readiness to settle for "peaceful coexistence"; are we then face to face with some ineluctable judgment of fate or God?

WEIGHING THE PAST

In terms of the ultimate world struggle, how are we to assess the net performance of the immediate past from the comparison of the two sides of the balance sheet which I have just drawn up? I can draw the provisional conclusion that while things could have been much worse, in my opinion they could decidedly have been much better. International Communism is today

(Continued on page 34)

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
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



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Will the Future Redeem the Past? (Continued)

on an overall basis relatively stronger than ten or fifteen years ago, and the free world is relatively weaker; there is a marked overall advance by the one and a corresponding overall retreat by the other.

In history it is impossible at any moment to work out a neat, final balance sheet, for at no moment "in history" does history come to an end. *It all depends then on the future. The future could redeem the past or it could confirm it. But it will redeem nothing unless the question of the inevitability or otherwise of the developments of the immediate past is first squarely and honestly faced.* For either you believe that these things were inevitable or you believe that they could have been helped. If you believe that they were inevitable—namely, that the outcome of the struggle in China, in Korea, in Indochina; that the Communist penetration of Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America; that the absence of any effective counteracting force to the Communist Party; that the relative decline in Western influence and Western economic and military strength; etc.—if you believe that all these developments of the fifties of the twentieth century *could not have been helped, then you are already a Marxist.* For Marx, Lenin, and Khrushchev hold firmly (and Khrushchev repeats it every day) that the iron laws of history are precisely such that whatever happens, Communism will come out on top. Therefore, to them, and to you if you believe in the inevitability of these developments, namely, if you refuse to assume moral responsibility for them, the Communist advance and the Western retreat did not come about by accident; the universe was such, history was such, the nature of human society and its development was such, the economic, social, and political situation in Asia, Africa, Europe, and America was such, that the advance and the retreat *had to take place.* I warn you, therefore, against declining to assume full moral-historical responsibility for what happened during the last two decades, for if you do, you are already a Marxist and Marxian Communism will have already won in your soul.

THE ONLY HOPE

The only hope, therefore, is to believe on a basis of truth and not of darkness or sentiment or dogmatism that nothing of what transpired was inevitable, and that everything could have been prevented or reversed. Only on the basis of radical moral responsibility can you overcome the fatalism of the cosmologists and the determinism of the dialectical materialists. The future will never redeem the past, and we will only pass from one fiasco to another, from one pathetic drift to another, unless in contemplating the past we can put our finger with certainty on such and such an act and such and such a decision and such and such a person, and honestly say that this act or decision or person *could have been different* and therewith the course of events would have taken a radically different turn. If only people rose to the occasion, if only they

were not overwhelmed by their softness and apathy, if only they overcame their greed, if only they were morally strong, if only they were not selfish and narrow, if only they were not petty and spiteful and stupid, if only they were big, if only they knew what was at stake, if only they were not hypocritical, if only they trampled under foot the wide and easy way!

I know of more than one instance in which precisely and only because people lacked some of these moral perfections we are where we are today.

HOW TO REVERSE THE TREND?

I shall not go into any detailed moral-historical-political evaluation of the past. Taking upon ourselves the whole moral guilt of the past, believing that the present would have been entirely different if only people measured up to the historic requirements of the moment, and, therefore, determining that the future which will be the responsibility of this generation shall redeem the past, let us now quietly inquire into what must be done in the immediate future to reverse the trend of the immediate past.


Four conditions are absolutely *sine qua non*: unity among the Western allies, deeper understanding and statesmanlike assistance towards the peoples of Asia and Africa, winning the technological competition, especially in the matter of armaments, and winning the economic competition in productivity. *If the Atlantic world breaks up, whether from internal friction or external pressure, there will be complete disarray in the free world, and little will be left to oppose effectively the onward march of Communism anywhere. If the Asians and Africans are not understood on the deepest possible plane, and if the Communists prove that they are more friendly and helpful to them, then Asia and Africa will gradually fall to their wiles. If the Communists do better in the technological revolution, especially with respect to weapons, then all will be lost. If the West does not outproduce them, both quantitatively and qualitatively, then the rest of the world will be sucked into their system.*

CAN WEST MEET CHALLENGE?

On the subject of Western unity the question is whether the Western nations can morally rise above their narrow nationalisms into a realization that it is their whole civilization that is once more today at stake. I believe they can. Nothing is half as important today as that the spiritual unity of Europe, America, and the Mediterranean world be understood and affirmed.

Putting aside the question of vision, will, softness of living, and unity of effort among the diverse factors involved, there is no doubt whatsoever that, by any standard of measurement, the material and human resources of North and South America, of Western Europe, of Japan, of Australasia, and of as much of Africa (and there is no reason why all of Africa should

(Continued on page 36)



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Will the Future Redeem the Past? (Continued)

not be included) and Asia as may be persuaded to cooperate can be so marshaled and coordinated as to outdo the Communist domain, in any field of human endeavor, by a ratio of at least five to one. It is all, therefore, a question of vision, will, overcoming the softness of life, and inducing the necessary unified effort. The free world has nobody and nothing to blame but itself if it cannot so order its house as to beat the Communists decisively in every realm.

MUST STAND FIRM

The West should stand firm at all costs against any further expansion of Communism, including above all the test case of Berlin. In a possible showdown, the obvious strategic handicaps notwithstanding, there should be no question in anybody's mind that the West would not accept a weakening of its position in Berlin. Some Western commentators have darkly hinted that the West would not "fight" over Berlin. It is fair then to ask, over what would the West "fight"?

HOLDING LINE NOT ENOUGH

But merely holding the line is patently not enough. This was the error of the doctrine of containment. It is a passive, defensive, unchallenging policy; and such a policy, except as a necessary first step, is doomed to failure; firstly because this is a dynamic universe; secondly because you are dealing with the most aggressive enemy, who will always swirl around and underneath and above all your containing devices; thirdly because a merely defensive or containing attitude means that you are so fat and satisfied yourself that all you wish to achieve is to get away with your own skin, and thus you have no vision, no concern for the rest of the world, and he who has no concern for others will sooner or later find that others, including his erstwhile friends, have no concern for him; and fourthly because you cannot be true to your own freedom if you do not wish and work for freedom for others. It is interesting to note the sort of qualifications that responsible leaders sometimes use for "peace." The Communist spokesmen employ peace without qualification; by which they mean that they should be allowed to carry out their international proletarian revolution "in peace." *But the spokesmen of the West speak of peace "with justice and freedom."* This is a correct qualification from the Western point of view—peace without justice and freedom is no peace. But what interests me most is, which of the two qualifications do they drop when they wish to use only one? You will find they usually drop freedom and leave justice. This is to me wrong. It could betray an unconscious readiness to sacrifice freedom for what is sentimentally called justice. Both are certainly necessary, but freedom is more fundamental. Freedom creates justice, but not conversely; for justice could be something mechanical without the ultimate freedom of the spirit which demands and creates and recognizes and enforces justice. The West

can only be true to itself if it says, "I am prepared to settle for peace with freedom and justice," and if it wants to use only one of the two, "I am prepared to settle for peace with freedom."

POLICY OF LIBERATION

It follows that an active policy of liberation is of the essence of any sound Western program for the coming years. When the late John Foster Dulles spoke of liberation shortly after he became Secretary of State, was there a Communist or fellow-traveling or Olympian or softheaded or pacifist or appeasing voice in the world that did not attack him? This synchronization of all these voices against anyone who would dare stand up and actively challenge Communism is one of the strange phenomena of this age. It measures the success of international Communism in intimidating and softening up the free world.

But only a believing, active, sustained and bold looking forward to a free Eastern Europe, a free Russia, and a free China is worthy of the magnitude of the gigantic world struggle. A radical distinction must be made between the great peoples of these countries and their Communist governments. Policies should be devised and pursued in conformity with this distinction. The flame of freedom must be kept burning in the soul of the oppressed. The hope of liberation must never be allowed to fade away from their hearts. As free peoples they have an honorable and equal place in the company of the free. Their energies will be given the freest scope. Their spiritual and cultural contributions to the whole world are awaited and welcomed. With vision and leadership the West should be able to promise them greater material benefits than any they have been able to achieve under Communism; benefits which they themselves would acquire by their own free exertions. But they should be promised much more: they should be assured of the freedom to criticize, the freedom to think, the freedom to create, the freedom to live, the freedom to work, the freedom to choose and turn out their own governments, the freedom to lead on the basis of merit in a world freed of the poison of mistrust, subversion, and intrigue. The Russians should be loved for their great spiritual heroes, such as Pushkin, Seraphim, Dostoyevski; and should be constantly reminded of them. The wonderful spiritual genius of Russia should be separated from the alien Marxism with which the Russians are now afflicted. The promise of freedom with equal material benefits to the oppressed should be far more potent than the allurement of a material revolution coupled with enslavement to the free.

THE COMMUNIST INTENT

The Communists never tire of assuring the rest of the world that "peaceful coexistence" only means that they will realize their unalterable aim of communizing the world without war, and that where they do not succeed in this, they will keep in mind the possibility

(Continued on page 38)

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- Will everyone be able to hear the signals in all parts of the building?
- Will the system automatically call the fire department, or must someone try to reach the fire station by phone?
- Will the fire alarm system automatically tell us (and the fire department) if and when it isn't working... or do we just assume we're still protected?

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Will the Future Redeem the Past? (Continued)

of non-peaceful means. They are, therefore, absolutely determined to dominate the world with or without war. This was explicitly stated by the international Communist congress to which I referred. They therefore speak of the "doomed classes" and of "burying" you and me. We should not be misled by the terms they use, such as "capitalism," "imperialism," "American imperialism," "Anglo-Saxon or Anglo-American imperialism," "bourgeois society," etc. These are only revolutionary slogans employed by them to excite and enlist people in their international proletarian revolution. *What they are saying behind all this jargon is that the international Communist movement wants to overthrow every existing government, regime, system, outlook, religion, and philosophy, and bring the whole world, all human thought, aspiration, action, and organization under its absolute control. This is their declared, unchanged, and unchanging objective.*

I have yet to hear one Western leader who, assured to his face that he is doomed and will be "buried," can muster enough courage and conviction, if not to use the vulgar phrase "bury" with respect to Communism itself, at least to use some such civilized expression as that the days of Communism are numbered and that Communism will one day be completely forgotten.

THE SOFTENING-UP PROCESS

And, whereas international Communism believes and acts on the belief that the days of everything non-Communist are numbered, my deepest fear is that Western leadership believes no such thing with respect to Communism; my fear is that the softening-up process has reached such an advanced state that all now believe that Communism is here to stay, and that, therefore, the utmost they can do is to manage somehow to "coexist" with it. The deepest crisis of the West is the crisis of faith in its own values; whereas Communism believes that non-Communist values must be eliminated from the face of the earth, and acts on this belief, the West no longer believes that Communist values themselves are doomed to utter destruction and oblivion, and therefore no longer acts on this belief. I have yet to meet or know of one important Western leader who entertains a dynamic vision for the Communist realm which includes the certainty that the children of present-day Communists will have completely repudiated Communism and will have adopted the fundamental values of freedom. Let the West face up to this advanced state of decay in its own soul.

THE ULTIMATE STAKE

But what is pre-eminently at stake in Mediterranean-Western civilization today is its human and universal elements. It is man who is denied; it is the affirmation that there is nothing that binds and cements all men into one family that is the prime

danger; it is the fragmentation of humanity into endless exclusivisms, whether national or cultural or racial or economic, that poses the deepest challenge. Western civilization is doomed until, jolted out of its complacency, self-satisfaction, and sense of apartness, it redisovers and reaffirms what is genuinely human and universal in its own soul. This means not only economic and technical sharing with Asia and Africa, but intellectual, moral, and spiritual sharing. What is supremely good must be good for all. Those who keep on repeating, as though they discovered a transcendental wisdom, that their ideas, their way of life, their civilization, is "not for export," but only their industrial products, do not know that they are thereby digging the grave of their civilization and the grave of their way of life. Those who come to Asia and Africa and tell them, "You stay where and what you are and we stay where and what we are; we have nothing to give save our goods and gadgets," little know that the day will come, and perhaps is already here, when Asia and Africa will turn upon them and spit in their face.

Man can live without goods and gadgets, but he cannot live without something human and universal that joins him to his fellow men. A civilization in which the human and universal has atrophied can relate itself to others only through force, and force is not an enduring mode of relation, and it can always be broken by force. I am not speaking of diplomacy and propaganda; I am thinking of a whole philosophy of history. I am saying that a civilization is doomed if it is not creatively conscious of something universal and human it can and must give; and I am saying that Western civilization need not be doomed because no civilization conceived and developed the human and universal more than it did.

THE NEED FOR FELLOWSHIP

Most certainly it is not a question of "imposing" anything on anybody; what is genuinely human and universal is never imposed; it is awaited, welcomed, and embraced. What is non-universal in your civilization you keep to yourselves—nobody wants it. Not until the businessman from Manchester or Detroit and the peasant from Iran or India can come together on a much deeper basis than the exchange of goods and money can the West really begin to have a chance in the ferocious competition going on at present for the heart and soul of Asia and Africa. Asia and Africa do not want to deal only with businessmen; they crave for human and spiritual fellowship. There is no exchange of soul, there is no sharing of life and ideas, there is no community of spirit, there is no fellowship of man with man. *This is Asia's and Africa's deepest challenge of the West: what have you to give me, not of your trinkets, but of your mind, not of the external husks of your life, but of the substance and marrow of your soul?* Again, I am not speaking of the requirements of any immediate emergency—I am thinking of a whole philosophy of history.

(Continued on page 40)

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
W271A Sono-Sentry* Motion Detector

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W614 Secret Sentry*

The Secret Sentry is an intrusion detection and alarm system that operates on the principle of capacitance balance. This insures maximum security for difficult-to-guard areas as well as files, vaults or classified objects.




W615 Taut-Wire Detector

The W615 is a pressure-sensitive wire for use outdoors or indoors. Upon contact, an alarm sounds locally or at a remote control panel. The Taut-Wire Detector can be mounted inconspicuously on any chain-link, wire or other type fence.



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The Honeywell Door and Gate Control makes possible supervision of doors and gates up to four miles away from a remote control panel. Two-way communications between guarded entrance is another Honeywell feature.



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Will the Future Redeem the Past? (Continued)

THE COMMUNIST 'MESSAGE'

The Communists bring in a message. It affects the whole of human life. It provides a total interpretation. They are not afraid to be revolutionary; to say, this is good and that is bad. They are not afraid to shock and challenge the received customs and habits and ideas. They believe in something. The West does not want to be revolutionary; it is afraid of being revolutionary; it does not want to shock and challenge; it is civilized; it is afraid lest it offend. Its trouble, therefore, may lie precisely in the fact that the content of its belief is very thin. For that which you really believe to be true and human and universal you will want to share with others; you cannot keep under a bushel.

The question is whether there is a profound part of your being that you honestly feel you must share with others. The question is whether you honestly feel that you are not complete or happy so long as others are humanly incomplete; that you are not self-sufficient so long as others are miserable or subhuman, a prey to every superstition and every dark fear. The self-sufficiency of the Anglo-Saxon world, its age-old protectedness by seas and oceans, is its greatest present spiritual trial. It has not needed the rest of humanity. *But the world has suddenly become physically one, and minds and ideas are much more critically and instantaneously and perpetually interacting with one another.* Only he, therefore, who feels with humanity, who is at one with all conditions of men, who is insufficient and incomplete without them, who is not protected and separated from them, can help them and lead them and love them and be loved by them. The incompleteness of the Communist until he completes himself in others is what gives him the dynamism, the vision, the appeal in the eyes of Asia or Africa.

AN AWAKENING NEEDED

If there were no universal and human elements in Western civilization, the thing would be hopeless. But it happens that the deposit of humanity and universality in this civilization is the richest in the world. *The civilization at whose heart pulsate Aristotle and Augustine and Aquinas and Dante and Newton and Shakespeare and Pascal and Kant and Lincoln, the civilization which has been blessed and transformed by Christ, needs only a mighty hand to shake it out of its slumber. And once shaken, once really awakened to the world responsibilities which it and it alone can shoulder, there is nothing it cannot dare and do.*

The Americans forsook the old world, and their one desire was to forget all about it; the Russians stayed in the old world and never ceased to interact with it East and West and North and South. In this simple difference in fundamental existential orientation the whole secret of the present and the future may be hidden. Can the Americans quickly recover

the intimacy of relationship with the old world which the Russians never lost?

NECESSARY STEPS

Negotiations and contacts must never be broken. The United Nations must never be abandoned or weakened. Cultural exchanges must be deepened and enlarged. The Russian people must be brought into intimate spiritual community with the West. Nationalism is not enough, and the new nations must be afforded the opportunity of belonging to larger worlds with wider horizons. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which is one of the greatest documents of this age, and which owes so much to the Virginia Declaration of Rights, must be vigorously held up as a standard of achievement for all nations and all peoples. The West must know its ultimate values and believe in them. The field of struggle must be transposed to the intellectual and spiritual plane. The prevalent softness and complacency must be overcome. The area of decision must not be left to the initiative of the Communists—the West must itself choose it. And so long as the head of international Communism in Moscow remains unchanged, there is no hope.

Can the future redeem the past? I believe it can. Will the future redeem the past? That depends on four things: on depth, on wisdom, on daring, and on leadership. I believe without high leadership daring to act in wisdom and depth the future will not learn from the past. These are things for which we should yearn and work. But in our own effort we may not achieve them. It is only as God wills that depth, wisdom, daring, and leadership be granted the free world at this crucial hour in history, that the future will redeem the past.

Charles Malik was President of the United Nations General Assembly in 1959, and has been a delegate from Lebanon throughout the life of the United Nations, and helped to frame the principles of the United Nations at San Francisco. Because of his numerous and stirring calls for a just and moral world order, he has been called "The Conscience of Mankind."

Dr. Malik was born in Lebanon in 1906, studied at the American University of Beirut, at the University of Freiburg in Germany, and at Harvard University, where he earned his Doctor of Philosophy degree. A teacher of mathematics, physics, and philosophy in Lebanon and the United States, he is also the author of *WAR AND PEACE* (1950) and *THE PROBLEMS OF ASIA* (1951). He is now Professor of Philosophy on leave from the American University of Beirut and University Professor at the American University in Washington, D. C. He holds honorary degrees from more than thirty American colleges and universities.

Industrial Security and the Arsonist (Continued)
the most serious consideration. This is the pathological arsonist—the pyromaniac.

The pyromaniac, of course, is deranged, a condition that makes it that much more difficult to apprehend him. The pyromaniac often appears to be a normal employee, showing none of the characteristics of an insane or unbalanced person. It is only after the case is solved that we are able to determine his motive. One pyromaniac told us, for example, "I set the fire so I could go home early." Another said, "I lit the candle in tribute to an employee who left the company." These are hardly rational reasons, and we have learned that an apparent lack of motive may well be the first sign of pyromania.

Arson Prevention and Detection

In all of our activities, our ultimate aim is to have no arson (and, for that matter, no fire) at all; however, with all our combustible materials, friction sources, and high pressure and temperature operations, we find complete arson control an almost impossible task. As a consequence, we at Ford—and I think our experience is typical of most large corporations—gear our program to arson prevention and detection.

Most alert industrial concerns recognize the need and sound value of fire prevention and protection. But, as you are aware, not all companies are as progressive as we would have them. Sagging sales, labor problems, and daily business routine tend to distract the attention of management from day-to-day fire protection. Sometimes it takes the threat of a business loss to put management into a properly protective frame of mind.

It is seldom too soon to pay full attention to the basic fire prevention and protection measures. These, as we all know, include good building construction; adequate volume and pressure of water; comprehensive sprinkler protection, when necessary; automatic protection for special hazards; and ample extinguishers and fire hoses. One can also list as basic protection night watchmen on patrol and employees trained as emergency fire brigades.


Realistically speaking, all of these things will not in themselves guarantee elimination of fires. They will, however, give us the assurance that we can deal with fires of all types effectively and quickly, saving our plants and facilities from catastrophic loss.

Protection Begins in Blueprint Stage

The most inexpensive and effective plant fire protection, of course, begins in the blueprint stage. Architects should plan facilities with noncombustible material, providing adequate sprinkler protection and yard hydrants throughout. Sprinklers, incidentally, afford protection against all types of fire over a plant's entire lifetime. Furthermore, they will deter the arsonist or greatly minimize his work.

Ford Motor Company, for example, thinks built-in fire protection is of prime importance. We ask our

(Continued on next page)





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Industrial Security and the Arsonist (Continued)

Fire Control Director or his engineer and our insurance company to check every new facility before we let construction contracts. And we go through the same procedure when we enlarge a plant or install new machinery.

Providing adequate mechanical fire protection for a plant, however, is only half the job; we must continually train our people as emergency fire brigades. At Ford, this training falls to the Plant Security Supervisor, who, incidentally, regards this as one of his prime responsibilities. To assist him, we make available a "technical man" who is thoroughly trained and experienced in industrial fire control.

This technical man, or Fire Protection Officer, makes thorough weekly fire inspections, testing and maintaining the fire fighting and special hazard equipment—carbon dioxide extinguishers, foam dispensers, deluge equipment, etc. He also trains the fire brigades and advises the Plant Security Supervisor and plant engineering personnel on fire control matters.

His job is particularly important in view of industry's increasing tendency to locate plants outside the limits of large cities. Such locations may have their advantages in certain respects, but they usually deprive the plant of a well-equipped, full-time fire department. Plant officials must call volunteer departments—some of which are simply not equipped to handle all fire emergencies. For this reason, we must train and equip our employees as fire brigades. Let me add that the heavy emphasis on the fire brigade program has proved to be very effective and rewarding over the years.

Effective Reporting Essential

So much for what we should expect in a fire-safe plant. Let's see what the would-be arsonist faces in a modern industrial operation. Normally, the Fire Protection Officer and the Security Supervisor investigate the cause of any fire and submit a comprehensive account of its origin and damage. This report includes the usual time of incident, method of alarm, source or ignition of fire, description of fire, number of injuries, length of down time, extent of damage, number and names of persons fighting fire, equipment used, and last, but certainly not least, specific recommendations for prevention of similar fires.

In putting together information for this report, the supervisor and officer know they must begin immediately—as soon as the fire is out and sprinklers and automatic systems are back in service. Fire officials have to work quickly; often they find themselves racing maintenance personnel intent on putting damaged facilities back into production. If the fire has been large, the team telephones or telegraphs the fire insurance company and the Central Staff Fire Control. And if the fire is of suspicious origin, they immediately notify city and state enforcement agencies and the company's special staff investigators.

All the security managers I have known feel that they have nothing to lose by reporting fires, particularly if we can get help by doing so. If the fire is at all suspicious, they know the value of getting "real professionals" on the job. This is further assurance that an efficient and effective investigation is started immediately.

As we know, determining the cause of a fire is essential. In fact, this is the principal objective of any fire officer—municipal or state fire marshal or industrial investigator. For if we cannot determine the cause of a fire, we cannot prevent its recurrence. The same is true of arson. Equally to the point, any court action resulting from fires will depend upon proving how the fire was started.

Let me emphasize that use of industry-community investigation teams doesn't send people in different directions. Quite the contrary; the team goes in the same direction, pursuing the same objective. Each member is helping the other—the plant fire protection officer preserving evidence in the rush to restore production, the industrial investigator checking the fires for arson, and the community fire marshal working to bring the arsonist to trial.

Up to now we have dealt with making a plant fire-safe as a means of holding damage to a minimum. We have also talked about the team that will go into action at the first hint of foul play. These are excellent first steps toward arson prevention and detection. But there are others. Let's examine all the odds against the industrial arsonist. What keeps his score so low?

Keeping Arsonist's 'Score' Low

In a well-protected plant, there are three main reasons:

1. We know that fire must have a place to start—some place out of the way of sprinklers and automatic protection. In these areas, fire protection officers make weekly inspections. In the same areas, at night, security guards patrol regularly, making hourly checks. And during the day, employees keep watch over the same areas. Employees thoroughly appreciate the work of fire safety officers. It is not that employees are immediately concerned with fire inspection programs or the elimination of fire hazards; it is just that they prefer not to work in trash and debris or under hazardous conditions.

2. In addition to a heightened sense of fire consciousness, employees watch and report. They are usually proud to discover a fire in time to prevent serious damage. Although his loyalty to his co-workers makes him reluctant to inform on them or testify against them in many instances (rules infraction, sabotage or theft), an employee generally is willing to report anyone who attempts to set a fire. Often we have located arsonists through information supplied by their fellow workers. Almost everyone despises an arsonist and will work to bring him into the open.

(Continued on next page)

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
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Industrial Security and the Arsonist (*Continued*)

We might remember, too, that the arsonist does not have an entirely free hand in the modern factory. Much of the plant area is filled with employees and foremen working in routine patterns. Anyone wandering about or acting strangely is likely to be noticed.

This forces the arsonist to work in the more remote, less populated areas of the plant, seriously restricting his scope of operation.

I think you can visualize the general atmosphere in a plant with a solid, well-planned fire prevention program. Employees impart a kind of contagious enthusiasm. This multiplies the number of eyes and ears for fire prevention by a thousandfold, resulting in increased difficulty for the arsonist.

3. In addition to plant patrols and employee watchfulness, there is a third factor that keeps the arsonist's score low: the automatic guarding device. Plant fire marshals take great care to install fire fighting equipment and sprinkler system regulators in special booths, and give fire detection machinery and sensing devices periodic checks. These precautions insure day-in and day-out protection for large plant areas.

These three factors, then—periodic patrols, employee watchfulness, and built-in detection devices—serve to keep the arsonist's batting average low indeed.

Detecting Arson

But let's suppose the arsonist succeeds in setting a blaze. What happens then?

The Fire Protection Officer, if he senses arson, calls for a Central Staff Investigator. This investigator is not a specialist in either fires or arson but in investigation itself. He considers arson another form of sabotage, recognizing, of course, that there are important differences.

His first move is to determine beyond a reasonable doubt that arson has been committed. (There are too many cases of sabotage by fire to cover inventory losses or excess scrap to go off half-cocked.)

Here, the initial work of the Fire Protection Officer, the Security Supervisor, and the local fire team may prove to be extremely valuable. These men were at the scene of the fire near its beginning and have had the opportunity to preserve valuable evidence.

When repeated arson is suspected, a Central Staff Investigator may even answer alarms. Being on the scene, he can devote full attention to finding new evidence.

I have said repeatedly that the time to gather evidence is during the initial stages of the fire—when it is still burning. Often before a fire area is cool, maintenance crews are busy tearing out damaged facilities and replacing plant machinery. This clean-up and repair operation is so rapid and done on such a large scale that later investigation proves almost

impossible. In many cases, a Fire Protection Officer who arrives an hour or a day after the fire has been reported will be too late. Production crews view the fire as something akin to ancient history and are cheerfully back at work.

Fortunately, the experienced investigator is aware of these conditions and overcomes them by working quickly and efficiently. He isn't afraid to draw on others for help, particularly firemen who were at the blaze and police lab technicians who have had a chance to analyze evidence. He reviews all reports and records and, if necessary, questions witnesses and members of the fire brigade. The Fire Protection Officer is often helpful here, producing the witnesses and additional records.

The Fire Protection Officer also volunteers information about the plant's facilities and equipment. He reports, if he can, whether automatic alarms and sprinkler systems functioned as intended and whether any failures were due to tampering. He also helps during the interrogation of suspects, supplying engineering and other data to confirm or refute suspects' statements.

When investigating equipment and material, he becomes a special variety of scientific sleuth. He examines material in terms of its flash point, its tendency to resist or support fire, and any other characteristics that might be meaningful to the Central Office Investigator.

Running Down Fire's Cause

The Fire Protection Officer also consults the Maintenance Foreman and asks for information about the construction material. He asks about the type and condition of equipment and about the damage—in terms of cost—of the fire. Frequently, he asks the foreman to provide records of maintenance inspections. These tell the time the fire area was last inspected, report on general conditions at the time, and reveal the names of the last inspection team. Inspectors, incidentally, are usually excellent sources of information and sometimes even recall facts about similar fires in the area.

Plant Security also joins the team early in the investigation. He scans reports of suspicious behavior as reported by both his security force and other employees. His guards are instructed to report all leads to the security office, whether they originated among employees, foremen, or through the grapevine. The Plant Security Office becomes a natural control center for investigations, and the Central Staff Investigator frequently establishes an advance investigation headquarters. The security officer offers to provide transportation, employee records and other services and materials that add to the efficiency of the investigation.

Of course, the moment we feel the case is at all out of the ordinary, we call in the experts—the "real professionals" from the nearby city or state fire bureaus.

Case History of Arson

Some time ago, we had a series of fires in one of our parts depots. The fire was obviously arson and proved to be typical in its origin, location, and difficulty of solution. The arsonist's motivation was typical, as was the work of the investigating team. City, state and industrial investigators worked together to solve the crime and apprehend the criminal.

Our case began in one of our large parts depots. One part of the depot was devoted to the storage of fenders, doors, hoods and other body parts. These parts were wrapped in a material called Cadwrap—a processed wrapping paper, consisting of two layers of glossy paper, a layer of excelsior, and an outside shell of heavy, crinkled paper.

Workers come and go in this area to store parts or to obtain parts for shipment. Except for this function, however, there is very little reason for workers to be near the Cadwrap area.

On June 8, about 3:29 p.m., a fire was discovered among bales of Cadwrap. It was quickly extinguished and damage was slight.

Five weeks later, on July 17, about 2:20 p.m., another fire broke out in the Cadwrap. Again, prompt action extinguished the fire. Again, damage was slight.

On August 28—about six weeks later—at about 11:15 a.m., a third fire broke out in the Cadwrap, this time resulting in \$3,000 damage.

The next month, on September 10, at about 10:00 a.m., a fifth fire broke out, causing \$4,000 damage.

In all of these fires the building sprinkler system and quick work by the depot fire brigade and municipal fire department effectively stopped the fire and prevented large-scale damage.

Starting with the third fire, however, (the one with the first significant damage), we had a pretty clear idea that we were dealing with an arsonist. The depot's first step was to call the municipal Fire Chief and a detective from the State Police, and ask them to start an immediate investigation.

These men sifted all known information for leads. They laboratory tested Cadwrap samples to rule out spontaneous combustion. They carefully investigated the depot's construction material and checked its electrical wiring. None of these leads proved fruitful.

They then initiated, with the full cooperation of supervisors, a well-organized surveillance of all work locations and worker movements. This plan, however, failed to produce any new leads and had been abandoned by the time of the fourth fire.

The professional fire and police team then asked a Ford Central Staff Investigator to join them, a move which rounded out their apprehension team. When the fifth fire occurred the next day, all three men were on the job; in fact, all three arrived at the fire before it was fully extinguished. On-the-spot investigation, however, failed to yield any new evidence, and the team felt new approaches were now necessary.

(Continued on next page)

"GOOD OLD DAYS" NO SNAP AT THE OFFICE

Coffee breaks are the rule in 8 out of 10 offices today, according to a survey by the National Office Management Association, and 75 per cent allow smoking without restriction. In addition, 65 per cent give Christmas parties, and 40 per cent hold summer picnics. If that doesn't seem like progress for the white collar clan, here are some office rules that a New York company posted in October, 1863:

1. Office employees each day will fill lamps, clean chimneys and trim wicks. Wash windows once per week.
2. Each clerk will bring a bucket of water and a scuttle of coal for the day's business.
3. Make your pens carefully. You may whittle nibs to your individual taste.
4. Men employees will be given an evening off each week for courting, or two evenings a week if they go regularly to church.
5. After 13 hours labor in the office, the employee should spend the remaining time reading the Bible and other good books.
6. An employee who smokes cigars, uses liquor in any form, or frequents pool rooms or public halls, or gets shaved in a barber shop, will be giving good reason to suspect his worth, intentions, integrity and honesty.
7. The employee who has performed his labors faithfully and without fault for five years will be given an increase of five cents per day in his pay, provided profits from business will permit it.

Industrial Security and the Arsonist (*Continued*)

Reviewing the Evidence

They sat down and reviewed their facts. Fires had started. There had been no witnesses. There was no evidence. There were no logical suspects. But they knew that the Cadwrap was stacked on pallets, three high. They knew that the fires had started in the middle pallet about three feet above the floor, and they knew that the fires could not start by themselves. They also knew that no visitors had been in the area, and that each fire had started earlier in the day than the last. In addition, the investigators knew that there was no known company-employee friction in the depot, and that every employee had been busy at his job when the last two fires were discovered. Finally, they knew that the fires had been set without any apparent motive.

Conclusions Reached

From this information, meager though it was, the investigators came to the following conclusions:

The lack of apparent motive made it reasonable that the arsonist could be mentally unbalanced. If this were true, other acts of an unbalanced nature might give them a lead. They knew that unbalanced persons tend to make unreliable statements on company records and that a check of personnel records might prove fruitful. Fortunately, they didn't need to search all personnel records. They reasoned that, since the depot had never had an arson case before, there was an excellent chance that the arsonist was a new employee. Furthermore, since all employees in the depot had been working at their proper jobs at the time of the fires, there was a better-than-even chance that the arsonist might be a sweeper or hi-lo driver.

With the help of the depot's employment office, the investigating team studied a list of employees hired in May and early June—the months prior to the first fire. The team gave special attention to employees with new jobs and to those who worked in the Cadwrap area.

After extensive examination of records and forms, the investigators found exactly what they were looking for: an obviously false statement. One employee, age 18, who had been employed on June 5 as a sweeper, stated on his application for employment that he was a truck driver at the age of 13 and a member of the Marine Corps at 15.

The team, convinced they had a prime suspect, then turned to the depot's attendance records for confirming evidence. These records showed that the suspect had worked on each of the fires, and had taken part in the fire-fighting.

Certain they were on the correct track, the Central Staff Investigator made a check of the suspect's neighborhood. He learned from neighbors that the suspect had come from a broken home and that he had a rec-

ord of juvenile delinquency. He also learned that the suspect had a record of auto theft and that he had been discharged from the Marine Corps after 18 days of service. The reason for discharge was emotional instability.

Unmasking Suspect

The Central Staff Investigator returned to the depot, reported to the rest of the team, and began an extended interview with the suspect.

The suspect explained that he had no ill feeling toward the company or his supervisors. In fact, he said he liked his job. He even did many things, he explained, that weren't required of him. Hadn't he put out fires when they occurred in his area? Hadn't he been sent home time and again with clothes drenched from fire-fighting?

This was the opening the investigator was waiting for. He asked why the employee wanted to go home. What was it about his job that made him want to leave? The employee denied that there was anything wrong with his job. It's true, he said, that he didn't like being called a "sweeper." And his wife didn't like it either. But the job itself was fine.

The investigator wasn't satisfied. Patiently, he turned again and again to the crucial point: Why did you want to go home? The suspect finally agreed that home was an attractive place. He had been married only a few months before and was impatient to see his wife.

The Central Staff Investigator turned over in his mind the report he had written earlier in the week. Neighbors of the suspect had told him that the sweeper was married to a girl described as "shapely and beautiful." The sweeper was with her incessantly, doing things for her, paying attention to her, and generally continuing the courtship that had led to his marriage. He made no secret of his affections, and took an overwhelming pride in having a young and attractive wife.

Paradoxically, he also fought with her, although, following each tussle, he redoubled his attention and devotion.

Now everything seemed to fit. The investigator confronted the suspect squarely with the personnel records, the neighbor's testimony, and the circumstantial evidence and asked him to admit the fires. The employee, sensing the inevitable, admitted the arson. "I set the fires," he confessed, "to be home with my wife."

He said that early in his employment he learned that men who were drenched in fire-fighting would be sent home. The same day he plotted his first fire. The investigator saw the rest of the evidence fitting nicely. Each fire had been started earlier than the last. Each time the employee had been on the job, moving about as a sweeper. Each time he had fought the fires, drenching himself thoroughly with water.

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
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


POWERS-MOSLER OBJECT ALARM

MODEL AL-25P



MONITOR UNIT



The Object Alarm provides security for industrial plants, military installations and other facilities. It is a versatile alarm system designed for the protection of specific objects which require security; for example, safes, desks, file cabinets or storage lockers. Combinations of objects can be protected by a single circuit and easily varied as your requirements change. Windows, doors and other wall openings such as grills and registers can be adapted to the system. The degree of protection can range from proximity to actual physical contact.

Upon close approach or contact with the protected object, an alarm is sounded at the Monitor in the guard office. No indication of an alarm is given to warn the intruder that his presence is known. The Monitor can be located up to one mile distant from the object protected.

A unique feature of the Object Alarm is the complete self-supervision provided at all times. Any tampering or attack upon the wiring will activate the alarm at the Monitor.



SIGNAL UNIT

*Complete electronic
protection for*
**FILE CABINETS
SAFES • DESKS
STORAGE LOCKERS**

POWERS
OBJECT
ALARM

66B
CIRCULAR


POWERS-MOSLER OBJECT ALARM

TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION

MONITOR UNIT

The transistorized Monitor Unit contains the red alarm light and buzzer signal. A DAY-NIGHT meter is provided for checking status of operation and circuit performance. When system operation is changed by the DAY-NIGHT switch an alarm is sounded at the Monitor Unit. Positive control of system operation is strictly maintained.

Monitor panels for Object Alarms or other alarm systems may be grouped into one central control panel. Each control panel is specifically designed to meet the requirements of your guard office or any central monitoring area.




FINISH Gray Wrinkle

MOUNTING Surface

POWER SUPPLY 115V AC 60 cycle
Stepped Down and Rectified to 6V DC

CHANGE TO EMERGENCY POWER Automatic

EMERGENCY POWER SUPPLY 6V Battery



FINISH Gray Wrinkle

MOUNTING Surface

EXTERNAL POWER SUPPLY None required

OPERATING POWER SUPPLY 1 1/2V Battery

OBJECT ALARM FEATURES

- WIDE RANGE OF SENSITIVITY
- NO SIGNAL GIVEN TO WARN INTRUDER
- SELF-SUPERVISION AT ALL TIMES

TECHNICAL DATA — Refer to Form P-106

TYPICAL CAPACITIES (single unit)

- One very large safe (3' wide x 2' deep x 6' high)
- Two medium size safes.
- Six floor standing file cabinets (closely spaced)
- Nine windows (6' x 4')
- Six Single Doors (30" x 80")



THE POWERS REGULATOR COMPANY • SKOKIE, ILLINOIS

MANUFACTURERS OF CONTROL SYSTEMS SINCE 1891 • OFFICES IN PRINCIPAL CITIES IN U.S.A. AND CANADA

Here was the motive: an ardent, emotionally unbalanced young man couldn't tolerate separation from his wife. At the advice of his attorney, the arsonist pleaded guilty and was soon on his way to psychiatric treatment.

I believe this case illustrates typical industrial arson. It also illustrates the advantages of a full program of prevention, control, and investigation.

Robert J. Boise has been associated with the Security Department, Industrial Relations Staff, Ford Motor Company, Dearborn, Michigan, since 1946, following service in the U. S. Army during World War II.

He served eight years as a special investigator handling applicant investigations, Workmen's Compensation inquiries and criminal cases. From 1954 to June 1959 he directed a company-wide program for the plant protection activity, developing and implementing security manpower controls, standardizing protective practices and planning the design and arrangement of more efficient security facilities.

In June 1959 he was placed in charge of the Security Department. In this position he manages the plant protection, fire protection, investigation and military security staff activities as well as two guard service units.

Mr. Boise is a member of the American Society for Industrial Security and is currently Chairman of the Public Relations Committee for the 7th National Seminar to be held in Detroit in October 1961. He is also a member of the American Ordnance Association, the National Defense Transportation Association, the Southeastern Michigan Association of Chiefs of Police, the Detroit Board of Commerce and the National Security Industrial Association.

Security Education and Enforcement (Continued)

instruction and enforcement, to be meaningful, should be job-related, company-related, and national defense-related.

Security discipline is established in the same manner as any other good management/employee relationship, namely:

1. The instruction of employees so they will know, understand and respect the rules and regulations they are expected to observe and the performance requirements of their assigned duties;
2. The maintenance of an orderly, business-like atmosphere, based on good management practices which foster individual self-discipline and habitual conformance to security requirements; and,
3. The correction of employee violations of security procedures promptly, impartially, and constructively.

If my premises are valid, we may establish the operational principle that our educational techniques must emphasize the job-related approach, and sell the fact that security is an integral and inherent responsibility of every job description and assignment—whether it appears in print or not. In this connection you may be interested in learning that we in security were successful two years ago in selling top management at Hughes on the necessity for including the following item in the Statement of Common Responsibility and Authority for all Management Positions: "...understands and complies with company security

requirements. Interprets security requirements for subordinates and assures they understand and comply with them."

INSTRUCTION ESSENTIAL

While I am neither a professional educator nor psychologist, I understand that disciplining the mind and attitude through instruction, study, and guided experiences is an essential part of the educational process. But here we run into trouble. Instruction is a two-way process; it involves both instructor and student. In our business the teaching aspects are far more important—and complex—than the learning processes. It appears to be true that improper communication of the requirements results in poor performance of them. A glaring example of improper communication is utilization of any method or technique which does not judiciously emphasize the significance of the program and the absolute necessity for acceptance of it.

I am reminded at this point of a statement made in my presence by a noted educator who said, "Even under the best of circumstances it is a mystery to me that any two people can communicate effectively." Obviously, communication is an art.

A SYSTEM OF CONTROLS

By definition, a company's security program is a system of controls. It is management's method of insuring uniform implementation of its security responsibilities in all segments of its operations. The mandatory aspects of the Government's security program, together with the nature and extent of its requirements, suggests we are less than prudent if we tolerate ineffectual performance or an organizational structure or environment conducive to same. The big question is "what is there to be done"—not "what can we do." (We don't have to be popular, but we do have to be right!)

There are as many different approaches to security education as there are individual defense plants. Regardless of the type of program, there are certain questions, common to each, which must be asked and answered. A few of the more important questions are (1) What is the best method of communicating the requirements to the employees? (2) How do you get employees to accept their responsibilities and the obligations that go along with them? (3) How do you create a climate which is conducive to perceptive and total participation? And last, but not least, how do you overcome an apathetic atmosphere which has been permitted to exist for several years?

As Manager of Security at the Hughes Aircraft Company, I remember September, 1959, as well as I remember Pearl Harbor! Beginning then, and continuing for six months, we were involved in several security violations. (No useful purpose would be served in detailing the violations.) Each violation was a matter of great concern to management, and I might add, extremely embarrassing to me. Not that

(Continued on next page)

Security Education and Enforcement (Continued)

I personally was responsible for the violations—but I did have over-all responsibility for the company security program. As you all know, this vulnerability is an occupational hazard of those engaged in administering a security program.

CAUSES OF VIOLATIONS

For more than ten years we fought the problem of apathy at Hughes by every means at our disposal, with only limited success. Follow-up investigation of violations reflected that 25% were due to ignorance, either in the form of lack of knowledge of the requirements or misunderstanding of the requirements (of the two, the latter caused the most trouble!). It was unfortunately true, and embarrassingly so, that 75% of our administrative security violations were due to thoughtlessness, carelessness, haste, negligence, and the like. But of even greater and more serious concern, was the fact that the cause of each major violation in 1959 was not ignorance, but careless failure to comply with known requirements. Stated differently, each of the violations easily could have been avoided.

Hundreds of man hours of investigative work (both DOD and company) and thousands of dollars of the taxpayers' money were expended needlessly—not to mention the security risk factors involved.

The situation reached its climax March 17, 1960, when top management issued a strongly worded directive to the effect that security was a most important responsibility of each employee, and that management would not tolerate incidents involving the mishandling of classified information. The closing paragraph made reference to pending development and establishment of an enforcement program with "teeth" in it.

After much study and discussion, Security—General Office developed a uniform, workable and fair system of disciplinary actions which imposes a penalty upon the offender commensurate with the severity of the offense involved.

PENALTIES ESTABLISHED

Realizing the advantages which would result by minimizing Security's role in the project, and, conversely, building up supervision's enforcement responsibilities, steps were taken to issue the disciplinary procedure over the signature of the Director of Industrial Relations. Thereafter, distribution was accomplished through normal document dissemination channels.

Our Security Functional Procedure was issued 18 April 1960, and carried the caption "Disciplinary Actions for Security Violations." The main provisions of this procedure are as follows:

A security violation is defined as a breach of company and/or Government security requirements relating to the safeguarding of classified information.

A significant distinction is made between "major" and "minor" violations:

A "major" violation is defined as the willful disregard of security requirements, or the failure to comply with security requirements, regardless of intent, that results in the compromise or suspected compromise of classified information.

A "minor" violation is defined as an unintentional or negligent failure to comply with security requirements that does not result in the compromise or suspected compromise of classified information.

The procedure prescribes the following penalties for violations:

Minor Violations

First Violation

Verbal reprimand to five days disciplinary layoff.

Second Violation

Written reprimand to ten days disciplinary layoff.

Third Violation

Ten days layoff to separation.

Major Violations

First Violation

Written reprimand to separation.

Second Violation

Ten days disciplinary layoff to separation.

Third Violation

Separation.

I would like to digress a minute before describing details of the disciplinary system. The *impact upon employees* after publication of the procedure (*this one they read!*) was quite sobering, as you might well imagine! This was especially true within the ranks of management and supervision, because the system required that major organization heads, rather than Security Departments, be responsible for enforcing security regulations, and for disciplining violators. This was, and still is, the most significant aspect of the program, in our opinion.

PROTECT AGAINST IRRESPONSIBILITIES

We believe disciplinary action for security violations should be administered by supervision in the same manner as any other breach of company rules. Security disciplinary rules, like other conduct requirements, serve the same purpose as laws generally—to protect the majority against the irresponsible minority, to protect the individual against arbitrary action, and to provide those responsible for administration with means to carry out their responsibilities.

I would like to return now to the mechanics and results of the security enforcement program at Hughes during the past year of operation. Besides defining the "major" and "minor" violations and the range of penalties to be applied, the disciplinary procedures establish reporting requirements; provide for the existence and maintenance of records; give due consideration to prior offenses; establish a two-year period which has the effect of expunging the record as to prior minor violations; and establish communications channels. There is no provision for probation. In the circumstances the company considers probation is not the proper course of procedure for first offenders.

EXAMPLES OF VIOLATIONS

The enforcement procedure applies only to those violations which relate to the safeguarding of classified information.

Examples of violations covered by the procedure are:

1. Improper/unauthorized marking
2. Improper mailing
3. Improper transmittals
4. Improper addressing
5. Improper wrapping
6. Receipts not enclosed
7. Receipts not returned
8. Improper accountability
9. Improper storage
10. Documents lost
11. Documents misplaced
12. Improper reproduction
13. Improper destruction
14. Temporarily leaving classified material improperly guarded
15. Willful, negligent, or unintentional disclosure of classified information to persons not entitled to receive it
16. Failure to challenge, as required
17. Failure to submit required reports
18. Failure to escort, or escort properly, as required
19. Failure to change lock combinations, as required

CONSIDERATIONS GOVERNING ENFORCEMENTS

You may wonder why all security violations do not come within the purview of the Hughes enforcement procedure. There are certain conceptual and practical considerations which governed our decision. First and foremost, let me remind you that the exclusive purpose of this particular disciplinary program is to enhance the protection of classified information. Consequently, the violations must be related to Government contractual requirements and the contractual requirements must be security-related.

From a practical point of view the primary objective of the penalty program is to stress proper safeguarding of classified information in accordance with the standards and requirements established by Government agencies. The desired emphasis is obtained by limiting the scope of the program to coverage required to achieve the desired goal. Obviously, other means are available for appropriate handling of non-procedural cases.

We took and advanced the view that there would be a number of problems and considerations governing practical application of the provisions of our penalty system. Some areas which required thoughtful advance planning were: (1) that the regulations would be inequitably applied within any given area of the company; (2) that it was possible there would not be uniform application of the regulations in the different areas of the company; (3) that in many cases it would be difficult to prove the offense; (4) that there would be cases where an employee was penalized for commission of a "minor"

violation, and it would later develop that the violation qualified as a "major"; (5) that there would be problems of jurisdiction where offenses were committed in areas other than the offender's; (6) that we would have to negotiate and/or coordinate the penalty system with the Bargaining Unit; (7) that reaction to the program would be colored in varying degrees dependent upon the assignments and experience of employees, e.g., job requirements, preconceived notions, security experience, behavior patterns, etc., etc.; (8) that in certain instances it would be difficult, if not impossible, to fix responsibility for the offense.

PROBLEMS APPEAR

We were not surprised, therefore, when the anticipated became reality! The problems we had predicted appeared, plus several variations of them which we could not have foreseen. For the most part, and with varying degrees of effort and fortitude, we were able to successfully resolve issues and difficulties as they arose. Illustrative of the general nature of controversial issues presented to the corporate officers for resolution has been a question concerning interpretation of what is classified. Because the subject involves the very essence of our disciplinary procedures, and, consequently, has threatened the entire program, you may be interested in hearing how we have handled it.

We have received many inquiries concerning penalties which have been imposed and contested on the grounds that inquiry subsequent to time of offense disclosed that the marked document which formed the basis for the citation actually contained no classified information. Stated more precisely, the issue is whether disciplinary action should be invoked under the penalty procedure for violation involving a "marked" document when subsequent inquiry discloses that the document in question, although bearing classification marking, does not in fact contain classified information.

We, at Hughes, are of the firm opinion there are the most compelling reasons for insisting that this type of case should come under the provisions of our penalty system. We submit that the controlling factor in determining whether or not an employee-custodian is chargeable with a violation under the disciplinary practice must be the classification marking of the document involved. We contend further, that the fact that it is subsequently discovered that the marked document does not contain classified information is relevant only with reference to whether a major or minor violation has been committed, and otherwise constitutes no defense. Obviously, a major violation cannot be involved if it were found the document did not contain classified information, because the element of compromise would be lacking.

Inherent in the resolution of this matter is an understanding of policy, circumstances, and objectives. We contend the following considerations are controlling: If we should agree this type of offense

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Security Education and Enforcement (*Continued*)

does not come under the penalty procedure, it would free the employee from the deterrent and corrective effect of disciplinary action despite his deliberate or negligent failure to safeguard properly the marked document at the time of the infraction. This would be analogous to a concept of traffic law enforcement which would permit a motorist charged with violating the direction of an arterial stop sign, or a stop-go traffic light, to defend successfully his deliberate or negligent act on the ground that he was not involved in an accident, or that there was no other traffic affected by his failure to observe the direction of these traffic control devices.

Our system of disciplinary actions for security violations was adopted after a series of serious major violations and recurrent evidence of in-plant minor violations involving negligent failure to safeguard and store marked documents properly.

Our primary concern was that these recurring deficiencies evidenced poor attitudes toward security obligations and responsibilities. When viewed in this light it is obvious that the Department of Defense would look with disfavor on any contractor policy or program that would bar disciplinary action for an employee's deliberate or negligent failure to safeguard a document bearing classification markings, even if it is determined subsequent to the violation that the document does not contain classified information. Such a concept would completely ignore the significant and vitally important factor of attitude toward security obligations and responsibilities.

ATTITUDE HIGHLY IMPORTANT

We, at Hughes, are sensitively aware of the fact that unsatisfactory security ratings are based on poor security practices, procedures, and attitudes, with recurring deficiencies. We have adopted, as a principle, that good attitudes make anything possible, and, conversely, bad attitudes defeat the program.

Getting back to the procedures themselves, it is noted that failure to report violations promptly, in and of itself, constitutes a violation. Failure to report promptly a minor violation results in an additional minor violation; failure to report promptly a major violation involving compromise or suspected compromise results in an additional major violation.

When we established the system it was not intended to be retroactive in the sense that "priors" (prior to issuance of the security procedure) would be considered when imposing penalties. It was agreed that such "priors" could be considered only when applying the degree of punishment within the first offense bracket; that they could not be counted for the purpose of "upping" to another bracket.

You might ask how our priors are counted. Each major is counted as a minor when establishing priors in the minor categories. Each minor is considered for the purpose of determining the penalty to be imposed within the minimum-maximum scale of the major violation bracket involved.

"Wilful" as used in the procedure means "intentional," and refers to specific intent, i.e., deliberately ignoring the security requirements, compliance with which would have avoided the violation.

CONCENTRATE ON MINORS

At this point I would like to make what I believe is a very significant observation, with practical implications. Namely, I have never encountered a major violation which did not stem from, or otherwise involve, a minor violation. The theory and practicality is obvious: it is very important to concentrate on the minor violations; if we can eliminate them, I believe it will result in automatic elimination of the majors.

In operation, supervision and plant security jointly determine in sequence: (1) whether an offense has been committed; (2) whether it is covered by the security disciplinary action procedures; (3) whether it is a "major" or "minor"; (4) who is responsible; (5) what corrective action is necessary, and (6) what the penalty will be. Thereafter, the penalty is imposed by supervision.

OBJECTIVE IS DETERRENCE

It should be noted there is considerable range as to the degree of disciplinary action possible within each violation category. Since the objective of our disciplinary program is deterrence and correction rather than punishment, penalties are related to that objective. In this manner, mechanical and arbitrary determinations are avoided.

Each offense is decided on its own merits. The penalty is assessed consistent with the facts and circumstances of the individual case, within the penalty range schedule.

Since this program has been in effect a little more than a year, I think the statistics compiled accurately reflect the true picture, and will be of interest to you.

There has been a steady decrease in internal violations since implementation of the program in April, 1960. The first quarter after implementation resulted in a relatively small decrease of 12%. By the end of the second quarter, security violations had decreased a very impressive 39%. In the third quarter, violations decreased by 43%. And in the fourth quarter—up to the end of March, 1961—violations decreased by 45%.

Since imposition of our penalty system, a year ago, the rate of repetition is down to 12%. We have had one two-week layoff, and several second offenses.

DRAMATIC IMPROVEMENT

The marked decrease in violations at Hughes during 1960 resulted in an estimated cost-improvement savings of \$15,000 in man-hours alone.

In addition to dollar savings, the following general benefits have accrued: Our procedure pleases the Department of Defense (our best customer); it has reduced violations; it has enhanced security awareness; it has resulted in better housekeeping;

and, because of the above, generally has made management's job simpler and more effective.

In my opinion, the acceptance of a responsibility signifies an obligation for its performance. A fundamental concept of security is control. The essence of control is authority.

Authority is merely the means to perform a responsibility. Consequently, I believe that enforcement is compatible with education and no segment of management should be hesitant to rely upon it as the circumstances warrant.


Industrial security is here to stay. The certainty of this conclusion, coupled with the weight of the circumstances, points up the necessity for convincing all employees that security is a serious business. Achievement of this objective presupposes prompt development, establishment, and enforcement of vigorous and firm security programs. In this fashion we not only thwart the inevitable hazards and problems associated with a policy of procrastination, but

patriotically and effectively perform our contractual responsibilities as well.

In my judgment the true test of the effectiveness of our security program is the attitude of our employees toward compliance with the requirements. Security awareness is neither a natural instinct nor a tranquilly acquired trait—it must be aggressively and systematically developed on a foundation of understanding and respect. There is no sense nor purpose in approaching the matter with half-hearted measures.

While the security disciplinary program is not a panacea which will eliminate all problems inherent in security administration, it has proved to be a most effective tool. For those of you who do not have such a program, I highly recommend that you consider its merits and possible application in your own companies. Should you decide to adopt such a system, I believe you will be most gratified with the results.

Plant Security (Continued)



Security Investigations and Clearances

Grouped together into this unit are such related plant protective activities as: pre-employment clearances, badging, bonding, lock-key control, processing of requests for government-granted clearances, termination interviews, and internal investigations. Persons considered for jobs must be processed by this unit for company-granted Confidential clearances before reporting for work. Employees leaving the com-

pany payroll are channeled through here for security exit interviews and to sign termination statements. The Unit supplies picture badges for each worker, and other special identification as required. Included in the staff also are investigators assigned to guard against suspected subversive activities, property damage, theft, fraud, and the like. Agents of federal, state, county, and city law enforcement agencies first touch (Continued on next page)

Plant Security (Continued)

base with this Unit Manager's office when they find it necessary to visit the plant. When you have several thousand classified file repositories, plus hundreds of other file cabinets and storage facilities, it is not difficult to imagine that two locksmiths are permanently employed by the unit to do nothing but keep apace of required changes of combinations and to equip the plant with locks and keys.

Visitor Relations

With an average of 500 visitors a day to the Evendale Plant through three admission points, the Manager of Visitor Relations and his staff of nine receptionists and telephone operators have a man-sized registration, information, clearance, and public relations job confronting them. They are responsible not only for determining whether or not a visitor can satisfy the security requirements to get into the inner sanctums of the plant, but they must badge, check credentials, listen to complaints, and arrange contacts between host and visitor on an ever-increasing scale. In addition, this office also processes visit clearances for Evendale personnel traveling to other domestic and foreign locations.

Security Operations

Due to the considerable amount of classified material handled at the plant and the many employees coming into contact with it, plus the usual turnover of personnel, one Plant Security staff member has been assigned the task of providing continuous audits, inspections, and surveys to assure compliance with established security practices. He also conducts educational sessions for groups of employees and creates and distributes educational media; keeps Standard Operating Procedures up to date; inspects the document logs of custodians, and conducts accountable document inventories twice a year. As this facility does not have a central control station for transmission of classified material, he uses up quite a lot of shoe leather maintaining strict surveillance over the 200-plus stations set up throughout the plant! This specialist's task specifically is to keep security foremost in the minds of the workers—make them think of security as a part of their jobs, not just a bothersome detail.

Security Programming

Since classified contracts contain security restrictions which can directly or indirectly affect cost, production programming, efficiency, and general job performance, Plant Security has one specialist who works closely with Marketing functions on all contractual matters which touch on security. He keeps a special eye on the Security Requirements Check Lists; sits in with Project personnel and works up guide lists to clarify those oft-nebulous DD-254's. This staffer also maintains close contact with the Security Representatives who are appointed in each of Evendale's 32 Operations to work with the Plant

Security regulars on a part-time basis on behalf of their areas.

Plant Security Administration

To handle the myriad administrative details of a Plant Security office, there is an Administration Specialist at Evendale who furnishes measurements, controls, and statistics when needed for planning and policy decisions. He also is responsible for the coordination of benefit plans, suggestions, and safety matters for the group. One of his primary concerns at the moment is trying to work out a system with village, county, and state officials to control the rather thorny problem of auto traffic at the plant. 7500 cars daily pour into and out of GE parking lots which adjoin the busy Dayton-Cincinnati freeway, and the resultant traffic in the morning and evening is a constant concern to everyone involved. About the only ones not affected by the traffic problem are the visitors who use helicopters which land on the front lawn!

Security Patrol

The Security Patrol, a police force of 86 guards supervised under the Chief by seven Lieutenants and 10 Sergeants, provides plant-wide services for the protection of personnel and property. The Patrol not only is responsible for the overall physical security of the plant, but also has a major hand in implementing government security requirements. The guards perform such diversified services as highway, gate, and parking-lot control of vehicle and pedestrian traffic; dock control; building, grounds, and perimeter patrols; checking of classified repositories, desks, offices, and manufacturing areas during down hours to prevent unauthorized exposure of classified material; destruction of classified paperwork; special escort service; operation of an ambulance service.


At left: Identification Office prepares fingerprint card on employee being processed for secret clearance.

At right: Locksmith making periodic combination change on classified Burnbox.





Nerve center of Visitor Control at Evendale plant. Credentials of each visitor are verified and filed by these clerks.



Plant emergency headquarters during staff exercise.

Fire Patrol

Realizing responsibility to its commercial and military customers and to its employees (and keeping in mind, of course, the matter of qualifying for a reasonable insurance rating) GE management has provided a first-class, fully equipped Fire Patrol at Evendale under a Fire Marshal and four Lieutenants for each shift to supervise 25 professional inspectors. An intensive fire prevention program is constantly maintained, especially in the areas of the plant which must necessarily handle flammable and toxic materials. Fire inspections are a continuous routine; welding and certain chemical machinings are done only after permits are issued by the Patrol; restricted smoking areas are part-and-parcel of planning each area. Auxiliary squads, recruited from the ranks of employees, are trained to augment the regulars, and are kept in constant readiness. Special services to neighboring industries are supplied on an emergency basis.

Plant Emergency

One of the "musts" for a large facility is disaster or emergency control planning, and GE-Evendale has a full-time Plant Emergency Specialist who is charged with administering and coordinating the Emergency Program, which factors in all plant activities from Manufacturing to Medical to Employee Relations. He has the responsibility for training an emergency staff and generally assuring maximum protection of life and property and the restoration of production if disaster should strike. He participates in a mutual-aid type program for emergency situations with other member industries of the Evendale Mutual Aid Organization and Civil Defense agencies. GE received national recognition for the "mock disaster" it presented on the Evendale plant grounds last year to tie in with the National Institute for Disaster Mobilization convention in Cincinnati.

Thus, you can see that Plant Security at GE-Evendale is fully complemented to take care of existing industrial security problems. As the facility's work diversifies, so do the demands for protecting military secrets and the physical facilities utilized, but I believe that my staff is so organized that we can take on any future requirements without breaking stride.



Mr. Davis is a native of New York City who graduated A.B. Columbia University in 1936. Earliest work efforts were in the fields of accounting, sales and credit with American Ice Company, American Locomotive Company, and General Motors Acceptance Corporation. Eleven years were then accrued as a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He has been Manager - Plant Security at General Electric's large jet engine facility at Evendale, Ohio, for the past seven and one-half years. He is a member of the Industrial Security Committee, Aerospace Industries Association, a charter member of ASIS, and former chairman of the Committee on Safeguarding Classified Information, ASIS.

More employees are mediocre because of lack of enthusiasm than because of lack of knowledge.

—*Ben Wooten*

When somebody sighs, "Life is hard!" I am tempted to ask, "Compared to what?"

—*Sidney Harris*

Securing America's Productive Strength (Continued)

1. They advocated a heavy progressive or graduated income tax;
2. They advocated the abolition of property in land and the application of all rents of land to public purposes;
3. Centralization of the means of communication and transport in the hands of the State and extension of factories and instruments of production owned by the State—better stated, the invasion of business by government; and
4. Equal liability of all to labor.

STARTLING SUCCESS

These objectives are still being pursued with startling success, albeit they did not cause a world-wide uprising of all labor as expected. Then Lenin, in 1923, laid out the master plan of the Communists in the following language:

First, we will take Eastern Europe, then the masses of Asia, then the Near East, then Africa, then we will encircle the United States, which will be the last bastion of capitalism. We will not have to attack. It will fall like an overripe fruit into our hands.

Each of you can appraise how successful the gangsters have been in carrying out this announced threat. Notwithstanding this warning, during the last 25 years the United States has had over 3,400 meetings with the Communists. The negotiators spoke 106 million words, which led to something over 60 major agreements, and Soviet Russia has broken all but two of them. Notwithstanding the record, our negotiators, hat in hand, are at Geneva once more to be taken by the Communists. Unless we Americans learn that you cannot treat these gangsters as you treat with decent folk, the ultimate outcome is frightening and clear. Lenin, the revered leader of the communist philosophies, said, and I quote:

A promise is like a crust of bread—it is made to be broken.

He again commanded:

We have to use any ruse, dodges, tricks, cunning, unlawful method, concealment, and veiling of the truth.

'INNOCENTS' AND 'DUPES'

Let me indulge in one more quotation because it has particular pertinence to what some of our misguided citizens have done. Georgi Dimitrov, in lecturing to the Lenin School of Political Warfare on how to make use of "innocents" and "dupes," made this statement:

As Soviet power grows, there will be a greater aversion to Communist Parties everywhere. So we must practice the techniques of withdrawal. Never appear in the foreground: Let our friends do the work. We must always remember that one

sympathizer is generally worth more than a dozen militant Communists. A university professor, who without being a party member lends himself to the interests of the Soviet Union, is worth more than a hundred men with party cards. A writer of reputation, or a retired general, are worth more than 500 poor devils who don't know any better than to get themselves beaten up by the police. Every man has his value, his merit. The writer who, without being a party member, defends the Soviet Union, the union leader who is outside our ranks but defends Soviet international policy, is worth more than a thousand party members.

EVER MORE ARROGANT

As the Soviets gain victory after victory, they become more arrogant and more convincing that, as unbelievable as their objectives seem to be to a free and freedom loving people, they are well on their road to total success. If we are to save our form of government, if we are to preserve for our posterity the privileges of free men, it is imperative that we continue the thankless job of trying to alert our people and to smoke out the spy, the informer, and the treacherous turncoat who aid the enemy.

GOVERNMENT SECURITY COMMISSION

In the early 1950's, stimulated by a sudden realization of what was transpiring, and after prolonged congressional hearings, there was adopted by the Congress Public Law 304 creating the Commission on Government Security.

The responsibilities vested in the commission by this act were broad and comprehensive. The mandate included the duty to "study and investigate the entire government security program, including the various statutes, presidential orders, and administrative regulations and directives under which the Government seeks to protect the national security," and to examine their administration and operation. The commission was enjoined to recommend changes necessary to achieve the declared congressional policy calling for a careful, consistent, and efficiently administered program that will protect the national security and preserve basic American rights.

The work of the commission was carried on with the assistance of an able and dedicated staff of approximately 80 men and women, including trained investigators, former federal employees, lawyers, educators, newspapermen and businessmen, who bore the burden of obtaining, compiling, and analyzing the information considered by the commissioners. For what we believe is the first time, a creature of the legislative branch was given direct access to the classified documents and files of all departments and agencies of the executive branch. An immense volume of factual data, opinion, and suggestions was gathered. Detailed questionnaires were submitted and lengthy interviews were conducted with responsible officers throughout Government. Thousands of letters were

written to private citizens and to labor, industrial, and public service groups having a special interest in the federal security programs, soliciting information and views. Notable among the responses we received was the comprehensive report submitted by ASIS. From it we obtained invaluable help in our consideration of the industrial security programs, and many of your suggestions are embodied in the recommendations of our final report.

The commission's final report was submitted in June of 1957.

To make our proposed program clear and concrete, we prepared and submitted suggested drafts of the legislation and executive orders necessary to effectuate the recommended improvements. We were gratified when, shortly after the report was rendered, a number of Congressmen saw fit to sponsor the bills we recommended and to urge their prompt enactment.

BILLS ON SHELVES

Our gratification was ill-conceived. The bills, like aging wine, are on the congressional shelves, gathering cobwebs.

The basic law suggested by the commission is a federal security act of some 106 sections, to be supplemented by four other acts and several executive orders and directives. It would be futile for me to try to describe all that we have recommended. I will,

therefore, confine my remarks to one of the most important of the programs, and the subject of your special interest, the industrial security program. A brief sketch of our recommendations in this field will illustrate the general philosophy that guided our work and the basic principles that carry over to other programs as well.


PROTECTION AGAINST ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE

Today there are few to deny the need for protecting the nation's secret weapons from espionage and sabotage. Technological developments in the arts of destruction have made the preservation of peace depend in major part upon a margin of superiority or a degree of doubt in the techniques of modern war. Dangers that once were months away, today are minutes away.

In this hour, the nation must heed those unhappy chapters in history marked not only by the acts of foreign agents but by betrayal by our fellow citizens as well. The daily newspapers reveal with unmistakable clarity that there has been no relenting in the campaign of subversion, and that the conspiracy of international communism still directs its weapons of deception and intrigue toward the weak links in the chain of American security. Our defensive strength depends upon the efficiency, the technical skill, and the productive power of private industry. Vital in-

(Continued on next page)

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Securing America's Productive Strength (*Continued*)

formation, which must necessarily be entrusted to defense industries, can be kept from enemy hands only through a realistic and effective security system, as free from error as human institutions can be made.

SECURITY SHORTCOMINGS REMAIN

Thoughtful persons, familiar with the prevailing program, have consistently pointed out as a major defect its cumbersome and inefficient machinery. Trammelled by red tape and weighted down by a complex administrative superstructure, the current industrial security system too often operates slowly and wastefully. A large portion of the program falls within the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense, and despite commendable improvement in recent years, I firmly believe shortcomings still remain. For example, a company which enters into contracts with two of the branches of the Armed Forces may be required to supply duplicate personnel security questionnaires. Employees may be subjected to repeated investigations and adjudications. Varying interpretations of regulations and diverse directives often create uncertainty and confusion. Lines of responsibility are not clear, and unnecessary delay is often entailed. It often appears that the Army, Navy, and Air Force are operating not under one program but under three entirely separate and distinct systems.

SINGLE AUTHORITY PROPOSED

The commission has sought to remedy the situation by proposing a single responsible authority for the security aspects of all procurement contracts under the jurisdiction of the Department of Defense. We were aware, of course, that unification of the Armed Forces has been advanced as the cure-all for many ills, and not always with unqualified success. But any degree of uniformity in this field should yield a full return in savings to both the Government and the contractor. The undivided responsibility, under the commission's recommendation, would be vested in an office of security to be established in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The new office would operate directly through Defense, and the three military departments would be relieved of responsibility. The officers and personnel presently assigned to industrial security duties in the departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force would be transferred to the suggested Office of Security, and all dealings between the contractor and the Defense Department would be conducted directly through this office.

The Atomic Energy Commission, the Department of Commerce, the National Science Foundation, and several other departments and agencies also operate industrial security programs. Although under the commission's recommendations all would have a common statutory basis, they would be administered independently at the operating level. To coordinate

these activities with those of the Department of Defense, and with the other government security programs such as the Federal Civilian Employees Program, the commission recommends the creation of a Central Security Office, an independent, non-political agency in the executive branch.

DUPLICATION, OVERLAPPING

I think the members of the Commission on Government Security need yield to no one in their dislike of adding still another bureau to the pyramid of commissions, boards, agencies, and offices now functioning in the federal establishment. But in the past there have been some seven committees, agencies, and offices endeavoring, on a part-time, incidental basis, to bring some semblance of order and consistency to the total security effort. Even among those coordinators, coordination has been lacking. On a larger scale, the same difficulties that plague the industrial security program within the Department of Defense have impeded the total security program of the federal Government.

Duplication, overlapping responsibility, and inconsistent standards and directives have exacted their toll.

We are all familiar, I fear, with the public spectacle of conflicting rulings upon the clearance of the same man between different departments or agencies. The people's confidence in the programs that protect them has been shaken. To subject the employee to repeated interrogation, investigation, and hearings imposes an unconscionable burden. The proposed Central Security Office would eliminate these drawbacks. Through its operations, clearances would be transferable from one government agency to another, from government employment to private employment under the industrial security program, and generally throughout the whole federal security system.

WOULD FILL IMPORTANT NEED

The Central Security Office would also fill an important need in coordinating the directives and regulations issued under the separate programs. Manuals and contract clauses would be examined for consistency and simplicity. Suggestions and recommendations would be made by the central office, both to the operating agencies and departments and to the President, who might embody the proposals in a universal executive order. A much-needed certainty, with renewed public confidence and restored employee morale, should be the result.

Another major function of the proposed Central Security Office would be the holding of hearings under the various security programs, including the industrial. Instead of the three-man board now common, a single hearing examiner would conduct the proceeding. He would be assigned to the case from a register of carefully selected, specially trained,

full-time employees of the Central Security Office with no other duties. At present, persons holding responsible, demanding jobs are designated to serve on hearing panels from time to time. *But both the interests of the individual and of the nation demand that the critical decision shall not be left to casual, part-time, amateur judges.*

The person whose job and reputation are in jeopardy has a right to be assured of the same standard of training and ability he would expect upon the bench in a court of law. He is entitled to a judge who was chosen for the job, and possesses the qualifications appropriate for it, and not one who was hired to do some other job. The employee deserves the decision of a man who has time for full deliberation, one who need not put the case aside because of the prior claim of other responsibilities.

TRAINING PROGRAMS NEEDED

The Central Security Office would conduct training programs not only for these hearing examiners but for other security personnel as well. In current practice, public officials discharging security responsibilities sometimes have neither the experience nor the competence for the delicate and balanced judgments to be made. The situation prevailing in the industrial security program may be taken as typical.

The military personnel assigned to a plant manufacturing secret material often perform security duties only as a sideline, with no special training. Transfers and substitutions prevent the accumulation of needed experience. *There is reason to believe that much of the difficulty with the existing program could be obviated simply by raising the abilities of the men responsible to the level prevailing in private industry.*

CENTRAL REVIEW BOARD

In the interests of fairness and uniformity, our commission report also calls for a Central Review Board, to be established within the proposed Central Security Office, to hear appeals, upon the employee's request, after the hearing conducted by the single examiner. The review board would consider the cases on the basis of the written record of the proceeding below, from all branches of the security system involving employment with the Government or in private industry. It would accordingly replace the review board now maintained in the Department of Defense. The decision at either stage would be only advisory, and could be accepted or rejected by the head of the department or agency. Thus, for the Defense Department's programs, the Secretary of Defense would remain free to overrule the decision

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Securing America's Productive Strength (Continued)

of the hearing examiner or the review board. As the man who must answer for the way his office is run and for the protection of secret information committed to his charge, the agency head, we believe, must be vested with the final authority to hire and fire.

HEARING PROCEDURES

The hearing procedures now in effect in the industrial security program would undergo considerable change under the commission's recommendations. In the first place, private contractors would be relieved of the burden of carrying an employee, hired for specific work on restricted duties, on the payroll pending his clearance. Upon certification from the company that the man will be employed if he is cleared, a ruling upon clearance may be obtained before hiring. Whether the person involved presently holds a job or is only an applicant, he would be entitled to a fair hearing upon definite charges and specific evidence. Because adjudication of disloyalty carries grave consequences, both economic and social, the greatest possible care must be taken to avoid error or mischance on such questions. If charges reflect adversely on the employee's loyalty, the commission has recommended that the individual be given a general right to confront the witnesses

against him, qualified only by the demands of national security for the case of the regularly established confidential informant, employed in intelligence work by an investigating agency which certifies that his identity cannot be revealed. No information supplied by other informants—neighbors, fellow employees, or acquaintances—could be considered unless they appeared to testify, either in person or by deposition, under oath and with full cross-examination.

SUBPOENA POWER CONFERRED

As a corollary to this right, the subpoena power would be conferred, to be exercised for the Government or the individual, and to extend to any person except a certified intelligence agent or an informant who supplied information on the condition that he would not be called to appear. These recommendations, if adopted, would serve at the same time to protect the interests of the nation and of the employee. By providing a more solid foundation in fact for the decision, the plan would provide for surer identification of security risks, and guard against loss of the services of a valuable employee through mistaken identification or other error.

CONFRONTATION

The requirements of confrontation would not, of course, apply at the screening stage. Here the exist-

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ing program would be retained without substantial change. All information obtained would be reported, as at present, and the investigators would be specifically directed to include all information they collect, the good with the bad. Sources would not be discouraged or dried up, since a person requested to supply information would still be empowered to impose a binding condition that he should not be called as a witness.

NEW STANDARD ESTABLISHED

The standard by which the cases are to be judged would be changed from the present order, which asks whether clearance would be clearly consistent with the interests of the national security, to provide that clearance should be denied or revoked if it is determined, on the basis of all the available information, that access to classified information and materials will endanger the common defense and security. This new standard, similar to that now employed by the Atomic Energy Commission, would make it clear that the employee need not come forward with evidence to establish his reliability in the absence of any specific charge: the burden of proof in the first instance would rest with the Government.

The specific criteria provided to guide the application of the standard are, under the report, reduced in number and clarified. In the opinion of the commission, any person claiming the privilege of

access to classified information bears the obligation of disclosing fully all information at his disposal which might aid in combating subversive influences, and any employee who invokes the privilege against self-incrimination casts grave doubts on his qualifications to occupy a position of trust involving the self-preservation of the nation. *Accordingly, a plea of the Fifth Amendment, under the commission's recommendations, would support a revocation or denial of clearance unless the refusal to answer were adequately explained.*


'SECRET' STAMP OVERWORKED

The industrial security program is designed to preserve defense secrets, to guard against the loss or compromise of information vital to the national security. Since the classification of documents and information by government officials fixes the boundaries of the industrial security program, the proper exercise of the power to classify is essential to a useful, effective program.


Unfortunately, the commission concluded that the rubber stamp of secrecy has been overworked. Particularly, we found that information has been classified as "Confidential" without the remotest justification in reasonable security precautions.

(Continued on next page)

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Securing America's Productive Strength (*Continued*)

The standard laid down in the governing executive order for this category of classification is so vague that the persons who must decide are left with no meaningful guide. The problem is accentuated by the fact that the power to classify as confidential is widely diffused into the lower echelons of the Government, and must be exercised by persons who have no real basis for appraising the danger to the national security. By seeking to extend the available means of protection over too great a quantity of information, the Government extends its lines of defense too far and too thin, leaving inadequate safeguards for the top secret and secret information that clearly demands the maximum degree of secrecy. Today, somewhat more than half of all classified information falls into the confidential category.

BURDEN ON CONTRACTOR

In the industrial security program, the huge administrative and investigative burdens of providing adequate protection for *all* classified information have led the Government to authorize the contractor to clear his employees for access to confidential information. The responsibility thus imposed is less than fair for the private companies involved, and less than adequate if the information actually demands secrecy. The contractor has no nationwide investigating staff at his command, and the government files are ordinarily closed to him.

For these reasons, the commission has recommended that the confidential classification be abolished for the future, and that clearances should be dispensed with immediately for contracts involving only confidential information. The adoption of this proposal should serve to permit the Government to bring to bear all its security capacities and resources upon the secret and top secret information that must be preserved inviolate if the nation is to survive.

THE BUTLER BILL

In the course of its work, the Commission on Government Security considered the proposal that clearance should be required for access to any installation or plant which would be vital to defense in case of war, even though no classified information could be obtained and regardless of the existence of any government contract. This proposal, usually referred to as the Butler Bill, we were forced to reject. In the total warfare of the modern world, practically all productive activity would be vital in time of actual hostility. The scope of such a program would be extremely broad, encompassing not only heavy industry, iron, steel, and munitions, but also automotives, machine tools, electronics, transportation, public utilities, chemical, pharmaceuticals, communications, including telephone, radio, television, and newspapers, and food industries as well. The cost of a program sufficient to clear all employees in every such industry would be staggering; the man-

power required would be enormous. The management of any careful company may be reasonably expected to take measures to assure that its plant will not be crippled by sabotage. In the event of armed attack, the imminent dangers can be readily identified, and immediate steps can be taken. This is a calculated risk that warrants taking.

MANY VITAL MATTERS

There is much more that I should like to discuss with you. The protection of information shared with allied nations, as under the proposed exchange of missile data with the NATO nations, the programs for excluding security risks from critical seaports and international airports and from international sea and air crews, the control of passports and visas—all are vital matters falling within the commission's mandate, and matters with which we are all concerned. Although successive Administrations have not seen fit to enact our report, it has served some good purpose. The Department of Defense Directive No. 5220.6 dated July 28th, 1960, leans heavily upon some of our suggestions, but it has not, so far as I know, been implemented. It is subject, in my opinion, to the fatal criticism that it constitutes a bureaucratic administration and hence is in the last analysis rule by men and not consistent with the American concept of rule by law.



Lawyer; born and raised, San Jacinto, California. University of Southern California, 1915, LL. B. University of Ottawa, LL. D. Admitted to California Bar, 1915. Practiced continually in Los Angeles since 1915, with exception of two years: 1917-1919.

Service in Army: Served overseas as First Lieutenant in command of Company D, 8th Infantry, U. S. Army. Graduated from Civilian Course Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, January, 1943.

Served as member of Board of Appeals of the Attorney General for hearings of alien enemies, World War II. Member of Congressional Commission to study Federal Judicial and Congressional Salaries. Chairman, Commission on Government Security and various other Commissions of State and Federal Government.

Past President, Los Angeles County Bar Association. Past President, State Bar of California. Past President, American Bar Association. Chairman of the International Bar Association. Past President, National Association of State Racing Commissioners; Order of Coif, Phi Delta Phi, Beatty Inn.

Member of the Commission on Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles, California; Chairman of the National Strategy Committee of the American Security Council, whose principal office is in Chicago, Illinois.

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
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How to Be a Good Committee Member

Serving on a committee is an honor—and a work assignment, too. Committees are the place where actual progress is forged. Hammering out details is laborious, but it has to be done through representative groups, or the all-over program would suffer. That's why "leaving it up to the chairman" is wrong as well as lazy: it cheats the membership at large. Members want **group** decisions—and how one helps his committee arrive at them determines the true value of his contribution. Here are some ways to keep in mind:

Attend all meetings. Continued absence may be interpreted as indifference, not only toward the business to be accomplished, but also toward the other committee members. This militates against morale and substitutes resentment for the fun of working together as a team. Never let an unavoidable absence go unexplained.

Prepare ahead for attending. Study the agenda carefully and anticipate the various questions that may arise. Gather all the facts available, decide which course to advocate, but be ready to discuss alternatives.

Find out what others are thinking. Decisions reached in an ivory tower may be logically sound but unpalatable to the members as a whole. They may be premature, in the sense that others affected may need additional exposure to the idea before any final decision is reached. They may be hard to grasp without considerable explaining. When a committee


knows this, it won't go all-out on a plan that needs introducing by steps. Conversely, sounding out some members who don't serve on the committee may indicate a readiness to go along on faster, stronger remedies than the committee had in mind.

Be punctual about arriving. One late-comer can hold up the whole committee, especially when the business is important. Time lost through waiting is compounded when matters already discussed or transacted are reviewed for the tardy person's benefit. If you are present and others have not come, urge the chairman to start the meeting on time (if a quorum is present) rather than wait for members who may not show.

Be businesslike. Help the chairman, and set a good example for others, by keeping pleasantries and irrelevant conversation to a minimum. If discussion wanders, help to guide it back again, either by re-emphasizing a previous point or asking a question. By your tone and what you say, keep the need for action apparent to the others. Don't be satisfied with inconclusive action; it's better to shelve a project by agreement than let it wither on the vine.

Don't argue needlessly. Splitting hairs and raking over non-essentials is deadening to the committee process. State your facts, interpret them if necessary, answer questions courteously, give heed to rebuttals—and then let matters take their course. Stay flexible, so long as the principle is not sacrificed. Preserve a balance between talking and listening.

The committee is often the proving ground for higher leadership. It is a favored spot for getting better acquainted with fellow members. It gives one a chance to introduce ideas and win approval of others. Everybody profits when committee members excel in their assignments.



“FACTS *are stubborn things...*”

(Smollett, 1721-1771)

Why play guessing games when it comes to plant security?

In safeguarding life, property and profits against fire, burglary and other hazards, ADT automatic protection services have proved their effectiveness and dependability.

Here's the evidence in a nutshell:

It's a fact—During the past ten years, ADT waterflow alarm service provided subscribers with an immunity against fire loss that averaged 99.98 per cent of protected values.

It's a fact — Throughout the same period, subscribers to ADT burglar alarm service enjoyed an immunity against burglary loss that averaged 99.99 per cent.

Dependability like this warrants serious consideration. Other facts about plant protection are contained in an illustrated booklet that's available (Canada and U.S. only) by writing to us. Better still, call the ADT security specialist listed in your telephone directory.

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AN AFFILIATE:

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1346 Connecticut Ave., N.W., Washington, D. C.

